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Abstract
Building trustworthy (dependable) systems is a major challenge faced by software developers. To this end, various
fault tolerance mechanisms have been developed by researchers and used in industry. Unfortunately, more often than
not these solutions ignore earlier development phases - most importantly, the architecture design to exclusively focus
on the implementation instead. This creates a dangerous gap between the requirement to build dependable (and fault
tolerant) systems and the failure to address these issues at any stage preceding the implementation step.
Software Architecture has been widely accepted as a way to achieve a better software quality while reducing
the time and cost of production. While typical architectural specifications model only the normal behaviour of the
system, ignoring the abnormal ones, several approaches have recently been developed which break the wrong pattern.
The aim of this paper is to survey the existing approaches to architecting fault tolerant systems, offering its
readers a clear picture of the state of the art research in this emerging area. This survey is built on developing a two-
dimensional classification of the existing solutions: the first dimension is based on the traditional software engineering
characteristics while the second one uses fault tolerance-related parameters. The paper analyses the major trends and
identifies possible directions for future research.
Index Terms
Software Architecture, Fault Tolerance
I. INTRODUCTION
While it is no longer acceptable to argue against the need to incorporate fault-tolerance means into software, it
is only recently that software engineering of fault tolerant systems has become an active research area recognised
by both contributing communities, software engineering and dependability (see, for example, recent workshops
on Architecting Dependable Systems [1], Engineering Fault Tolerant Systems [2], and Engineering Resilient
Systems [3]). For a very long time, each community treated the other as something on the fringes. More often
than not, researchers and developers working on software engineering left the issues of dealing with faults until the
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2very end of development, focusing on ensuring the normative system behaviour. Similarly, developers of advanced
fault tolerance schemes did not tend to propose solutions for engineering fault tolerance starting from the earlier
development phases. Arguably, this has been one of the reasons for a considerable number of failures caused by
malfunctioning fault tolerance means.
Let us consider several examples of poorly engineered fault tolerance:
• according to Flaviu Cristian’s report of field experience, up to two thirds of system failures in telephone
switching systems used in the 80s were due to design faults in exception handling or recovery algorithms [4];
• the failure of the Ariane 5 launcher was caused by improper reuse of component exception handlers [5];
• the Interim Report on Causes of the August 14th 2003 Blackout in the US and Canada clearly shows that
the problem was mostly caused by badly designed fault tolerance, including various architectural issues: poor
diagnostics of component failures, longer-than-estimated time for component recovery, failure to involve all
necessary components in recovery, inconsistent system state after recovery, failures of alarm systems, etc. [6];
• in their report of typical patterns of exception handling misuse and abuse in five customer and one proprietary
J2EE applications, IBM researchers refer to them as “bad coding practice”. It was found, for example, that
one in ten classes swallows exceptions without doing anything about them [7];
• in a frequently cited paper, the authors conducted an experiment that shows that in a 10 million LOC real-time
embedded control system, misused exception handling results in the introduction of 2-3 bugs per 1 KLOS [8];
• it has been recently reported that in the eight .NET assemblies (which represent the application, library and
infrastructure levels), over 90% of exceptions that can be thrown by the code are not documented [9].
• It has been shown [10] that exception handling design in industrial applications typically exhibits poor quality
independently of the underlying programming language or the application domain.
It is true that advances made since the 70s have included a plethora of fault tolerance mechanisms, a good
understanding of the basic principles of building fault tolerant software, and the dedication of a considerable
fraction of requirements analysis, run-time resources, development efforts and code to ensuring fault tolerance. And
yet we still cannot say that fault tolerance is always trustworthy. It tends to be the least understood, documented
or tested part of the system, which is poorly designed, misused and left until too late in the development process,
seldom introduced in a systematic, disciplined or rigorous way, and often not suitable for the specific situations in
which it is applied (in his famous paper on exception handling [4] F. Cristian draws this conclusion regarding the
exception handling code, but we believe this is true for fault tolerance in general).
Recently, however, a number of studies have been conducted aiming to understand where and how fault tolerance
can be integrated in the software life-cycle (e.g., [11], [12], [13]). It has been recognised that different classes of
faults, errors and failures are identifiable during different phases of software development, and that it is therefore
essential that fault tolerance is addressed at different phases of the software process, such as requirements, high-level
(architectural) and low-level design.
The emerging research area which specifically focuses on architecting fault tolerant systems has, in the last
few years, gained recognition among both academia and industry. This is due to the fact that the introduction of
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3fault tolerance at the architecting phase has the clear benefits of allowing developers to make good decisions, very
early into the process, about what redundant resources to use, how to use them efficiently and to establish if the
chosen recovery strategy will be successful. Making fault tolerance an explicit concern addressed during this phase,
however, raises a number of challenging issues which the researchers working on architecting fault tolerant systems
need to address. Some initial overviews of the state of the art in this area are reported in [14].
We believe it is the right time to systematically analyse this area and to compare and contrast the existing
work. Coming as we do from different backgrounds (software architecture and fault tolerance), we have found it
extremely fruitful and instructive to work together on this survey, trying to bring knowledge and traditions from
both domains into it. The core of this work is a two-dimensional classification based on parameters which originate
in both software architecture and fault tolerance. The survey is set to achieve two chief aims: first, to analyse a
carefully selected set of approaches using these parameters and, secondly, to describe the major contributions and
trends in terms of these parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. First, some suggestions are made as to how different readers’ needs could be
met in Section I-A. A brief outline of the fault tolerance and software architecture concepts is given in Section II. The
procedure for study selection is described in Section III, the classification framework is presented in Section IV,
while the application of the framework to the selected papers is introduced in Sections V and VI. Section VII
provides the final analysis, summarising the lessons learned and outlining the directions of future work in the area.
Section VIII concludes the survey with a brief summary.
A. Suggestions for Readers of this Survey
Sections II and IV will provide sufficient explanation of the main bulk of this paper for readers from backgrounds
other than the software engineering or dependability communities. If the reader comes from one of the two
communities, he/she may wish to read Section II more closely to familiarise him/herself with the basic concepts
related to the work of the other community, and Section IV for a detailed explanation of the meaning of each
parameter. Sections V and VI contain the main results of this study.
This survey will help practitioners to find specific solutions to the problem of architecting fault tolerant systems.
Their work should start with the definition of the fault tolerant requirements. At the next step, software architects
(working with the specification of a fault tolerant architecture which addresses these requirements) and the
dependability experts (asked to find an appropriate fault tolerant solution at the architectural level) would be able
to use the paper to arrive at a shared understanding of the terminology, problems and solution space. This would
create a common language for their discussions. Based on the results of our study, we expect that they will be able
either to identify an existing solution that would meet the requirements or to develop a new solution driven by the
existing ones.
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4II. BACKGROUND
A. Software Architecture
Software Architecture (SA) [15] is an established software engineering area which focuses on the overall
organization of a large software system using abstractions to express the logical coordination structure of complex
and distributed systems. The emphasis in SA is on capturing the system structure (i.e., architecture topology) by
identifying architectural components and connectors, and the system behaviour designed to meet system requirements
by specifying how components and connectors are intended to interact [16]. While there is no universal agreement
about what software architecture specification comprises, the concepts common to most definitions of software
architecture are components, connectors, channels, configurations, interfaces and ports. Properties and constraints
can be attached to architectural elements or to the overall system configuration. A coherent set of constraints and
rules defines an architectural style.
To specify SAs, informal box-and-line notations have been replaced or supplemented by formal and rigorous
Architecture Description Languages (ADLs) and by UML-based notations [17]. While UML-based notations for
SA modelling are increasingly widely applied in industrial projects, domain specific ADLs are more frequently
utilized in specific domains (like consumer electronics and avionics). Software architecture views and viewpoints
are also growing in use as a technique for describing an architecture from a variety of specific stakeholders’
perspectives [18]. Architectural modes which are viewed as different types of system behaviour in execution that
depend on different operating conditions, environment and stimuli [19] are also more widely used in practice.
Documenting software architecture is not, however, the only direction of research in the area. Recently, a
significant effort has been made to analyse a particular architecture and to generate a skeletal code out of the
architectural specification. A variety of validation and verification techniques have been introduced to either assess
how a SA conforms to requirements or to verify if the final system conforms to architectural decisions, as
demonstrated by the many conventions devoted to the topic [20], [1], [21], [22]. Once the quality and dependability
of a SA is assured, it can be used to generate a (skeletal) code, employing (semi-) automated processes [23], [24]. If
this architecture models only normal behaviours of the system, the code generated from it will be unable to tolerate
faults. As a consequence, the system may fail in unexpected ways if any faults occur. SA descriptions have been
also integrated in industrial software development processes, as shown in [25], [26] and tools have been proposed
in order to make specification and analysis rigorous.
B. Fault Tolerance
Generally, dependability is attained by using four means [27]: fault prevention, tolerance, removal and forecasting.
Clearly, in practice a combination of all of these is necessary to ensure the required dependability level. All of them
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5are centred around the concept of fault. In our survey we follow the dependability terminology from [27]1, which
introduces a causal chain of dependability threats. In this chain, a system failure to deliver its service is caused by
an erroneous system state, which is in turn caused by a triggered fault. That means that faults can be silent for
some time and that their triggering (activation) does not necessarily cause immediate failure. Errors are typically
latent, and the aim of fault tolerance is to detect and deal with them before they make systems fail.
This survey focuses on fault tolerance means that are used to avoid service failures in the presence of faults. The
essence of fault tolerance (FT) is in detecting errors and carrying out the subsequent system recovery. Generally
speaking, during the system recovery two steps need to be conducted: error handling and fault handling.
Error handling can be done in one of the following three ways: backward error recovery (sometimes called
rollback), forward error recovery (sometimes called rollforward) or compensation. Backward error recovery returns
the system into a previous state (which is assumed to be correct); the typical techniques employed to do this are
checkpoints, recovery points, backup, restart, transaction abort etc. Forward error recovery moves the system into
a new correct state; this type of recovery is typically carried out by employing exception handling techniques
(found in many programming languages, such as Ada, Java, C++, etc.). There has been a considerable amount
of work on defining exception handling mechanisms suitable for different domains, development and modelling
paradigms, types of faults, execution environments, etc. (see, for example, [28]). It is worth noting here that,
generally speaking, forward error recovery is more general than backward error recovery, as the former ensures
that the system is recovered by moving it into any correct state (which may be a previous one or not). To conduct
compensation, it is necessary to ensure that the system contains enough redundancy to mask errors by adjudicating
the execution results and system states. Various replication and diversity techniques fall into this category. A wide
range of software diversity mechanisms, including recovery blocks [29] and N-version programming (NVP) [30],
have been developed and successfully used in industry.
The nature of fault handling is very different as it is intended to rid the system from faults to avoid causing
new errors in a later execution. It starts with fault diagnostics, followed by the isolation of the faulty component
and system reconfiguration. After that, the system typically needs to be reinitialized to continue its execution. Fault
handling is usually much more expensive than error handling.
An area of particular interest to this survey is development of the atomic action mechanisms used for handling
exceptions in systems in which components cooperate. Forward and backward error recovery in these system relies
on cooperative exception handling, which involves several components. [31] introduced recursive system structuring
using nested atomic actions and resolution of exceptions concurrently raised in an action. The follow-up work on
Coordinated Atomic actions (CA actions) [32] extended this scheme to allow dealing with resources shared (or
competed for) by several actions using the mechanisms of the ACID (atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability)
transactions [33] and to explicitly support action abort as one of the possible exceptional outcomes. Another relevant
1The authors are fully aware that there are different definitions of the terms fault, error, dependability and fault tolerance, which results in
multiple frameworks for reasoning about this domain. The survey uses the terminology proposed in the Avizienis et al. paper to clearly define
the boundaries of this work.
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6work [34] put forward the concept of the ideal (or idealised) fault tolerant component as a general blueprint for
building components with well-defined fault tolerance (exceptional) interfaces and clearly separated fault tolerance
component behaviour. The choice of the specific error detection, error handling and fault handling techniques to be
used for a particular system is directly related to and depends upon the underlying fault assumptions. For example,
replication techniques are typically used to tolerate hardware faults, whereas software diversity is employed to deal
with software design bugs.
III. PROCEDURE FOR STUDIES SELECTION
The methodological approach used for identifying the papers relevant for this study makes use of both an ad-
hoc (manual) literature review, and a systematic (automatic) literature review. We used both manual and automatic
searches as a way to maximize the retrieval of relevant papers (as advocated in e.g., [35]).
First, we formulated some research questions. Then, in the ad-hoc review, the two authors (who have different
backgrounds and specialised knowledge in software architecture and fault tolerance, respectively) selected relevant
papers by looking at their own communities and networks and, more generally, at software engineering/architecture
and dependability conferences and events. The selection has been carried out according to inclusion and exclusion
criteria defined and finalized during the ad-hoc review. Conversely, the systematic literature review (SLR) was
carried out to analyse, in a more systematic way, the body of knowledge in the field. The SLR uses the set of
papers produced through the ad-hoc review as a pilot for testing the correctness of the SLR protocol.
A total of 75 papers have been selected and surveyed in this study, 39 coming from the ad-hoc review, 36 more
from the SLR.
The rest of this section formulates the research questions (Section III-A), defines how the ad-hoc study has been
performed (Section III-B), describes the SLR protocol used to refine the initial set of papers (Section III-C), and
some threats to validity (Section III-D).
A. Research Question Formulation
This study focuses on papers on fault tolerance at the architectural level, which involves approaches to and
solutions for tolerating those faults (errors, exceptions, etc.) that are caused by failing components, connectors and
other architectural elements, and affect the whole system.
In order to specify the aim of our research, a research question (with sub-questions) were formulated, as described
below:
Research Question: What are the approaches to architecting a FTS?
• Sub-question: What are the architectural methods, and processes leading to a FTS?
• Sub-question: Which architectural style/pattern is more appropriate for a FTS?
They are used to drive the papers selection process.
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7B. Ad-hoc Study
In the ad-hoc review, the paper selection process was driven by the authors’ experience of the field and web-
based searches using the most relevant search engines. We searched into the main conferences and journals on
Dependability (DSN - IEEE/IFIP Int. Conference on Dependable System and Networks, LADC - Latin-American
Symposium on Dependable Computing, IEEE TDSC - Trans. Dependable and Secure Computing), those on Software
Engineering (ICSE - Int. Conference on Software Engineering, ESEC/FSE - European Software Engineering
and Foundations of Software Engineering Conference, FSE - Foundation of Software Engineering, IEEE TSE
- Transactions on SE, ACM TOSEM - Transactions on SE and Methodology, JSS - Journal on Software and
Systems), as well as through those on both Software Architecture and Dependability (WICSA - Working Conference
on Software Architecture, CBSE - Int. Symposium on Component-based Software Engineering, QoSA - Quality of
Software Architecture, ROSATEA - Int. Workshop on the Role of Software Architecture for Testing and Analysis,
WADS - Int. Workshop on Architecting Dependable Systems). To supplement our findings, we ran searches on
Google and GoogleScholar.
As a way to drive the selection process, we incrementally defined inclusion and exclusion criteria, according to
the research questions.
To be included, a paper needs to propose novel architectural principles, elements and styles, development processes
and specification languages for reasoning about fault tolerance and its specific steps2 at the architectural design
stage. These would allow developers to explicitly represent abnormal system behaviour and state, and to express
decisions on how to use redundant structures for system recovery.
Papers not validated by the computer science community are excluded: only peer-reviewed sources are included,
while technical reports and PhD theses are not. Papers exclusively focusing on design and implementation, for
example, on fault tolerance design patterns or various fault tolerant middleware and protocol stacks are excluded,
too. This is consistent with our overall aim of analysing architectural approaches which are designed to make
applications fault-tolerant. Papers which do not explicitly mention fault tolerance, in general, or its parts (such as
error detection and system recovery) are excluded.
Table I provides inclusion and exclusion criteria. An article is selected if it satisfies all the pre-defined inclusion
criteria and is excluded if it fulfills any of the pre-defined exclusion criteria.
As a result of this ad-hoc study, 39 papers were selected that match the identified inclusion and exclusion criteria.
2as defined in [27]
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8Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria
I1: Articles which discuss software fault toler-
ance and software architectures.
E1: Articles that do not focus on software,
but only on, say, hardware or networked sys-
tems, for example “Multijunction fault toler-
ance architecture for nanoscale cross bar mem-
ories” [36].
E2: Articles which discuss fault tolerance at
the implementation level only, or articles about
architectures in general.
E3: A study which is marginally related to
fault tolerant systems and software architec-
tures.
I2: One of the main objectives of the study
is to present architectural languages for fault
tolerant systems and exceptional architectural
behaviour, methodologies, processes and ap-
proaches to architecting a FTS, or architectural
styles that support the development of FTSs.
E4: Articles which do not present methods,
approaches, styles or experience involving the
use of fault tolerance at the architectural level
of abstraction.
I3: A study that is in form of a scientific paper. E5: Articles written in languages other than
English.
E6: Articles not validated by the Computer
Science community, such as technical reports
and PhD thesis. For instance, “Self-assembly
for discreet, fault-tolerant, and scalable compu-
tation on internet-sized distributed networks”
(PhD thesis) [37].
TABLE I: Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
C. The Systematic Literature Review
The Systematic Literature Review (SLR) is a methodology created to standardize the methods of analysing
research in particular scientific fields. Kitchenham [38] defines the SLR as ”a means of evaluating and interpreting
all available research relevant to a particular research question, topic area or phenomenon of interest”.
The SLR can use interpretive synthesis, which aims to obtain specific-context knowledge through research articles
without any background or initial data-set, or an integrative review, in which the reviewing process is based on a
background of knowledge in the area of interest, which makes it possible to draw up an initial list of (pilot) papers.
In this work, we use the initial pool of papers selected in the ad-hoc study to run an integrative review process.
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9The systematic review process includes a number of steps. Following [38], [39], we defined our SLR protocol
by defining a suitable search string (used to match the set of research questions in the best possible way), a
time period (adequate to capture as many relevant papers as possible), a list of web search engines (used to
automatically identify a list of papers, potentially related to the review research topic), and a studies selection
process (used to select those articles that better fits our research questions).
1) Search String: Based on the study research questions, we identifies some some relevant keywords and
combined them in order to form the study research question. The search string we identified and used in the
SLR is: (“architecture” OR “architecting” OR “architectural”) AND (“fault tolerance” OR “fault tolerant” OR
“exception handling”). Although other relevant keywords had been identified, they were discarded in order to have
a query that would be both strict and as complete as possible.
2) Time Period: In order to minimize the risk of missing relevant papers in the area, we took into account all
articles published from January 1, 1995 to July 1, 20103. This time period was carefully selected in order to cover
as many relevant publications as possible.
3) Web Search Engines: The search string was run in the following search engines: ACM The Guide to
Computing Literature4, ISI Web of Science, and SpringerLink. The ACM - The Guide search engine includes all
the articles retrievable from ACM Portal Digital Library, IEEE Computer Society, and Elsevier.
4) Studies Selection: The studies selection process was started by putting the selected search string in the web
search engines we had chosen, in order to identify the articles whose title or abstract include this search string. The
selection process initially returned the titles of 3433 articles. Then, articles have been pre-processed to delete all
duplicates, PhD theses and Technical Reports. The pre-processing stage returned 2540 non-duplicated, peer-reviewed
papers. After that, the inclusion and exclusion criteria are applied when reading the introduction and abstract of the
2540 non-duplicated papers. 210 papers were chosen as a result of this stage. Then the selected papers are read in
full. Those matching the inclusion criteria are selected to become the primary studies. A total of 59 primary studies
were selected as a result of reading the full text of the 210 papers. Of these 59 papers, 23 were already part of the
ad-hoc review.
Table II summarizes the selection process stages.
3Comment: We sincerely apologize since this study covers articles published only till July 2010. Some problems have greatly delayed our
submission. Being aware of the research area, we may confirm that the results and findings are still valid. As soon as the paper will be accepted
for publication, we will carefully update the list of selected papers.
4http://portal.acm.org/guide.cfm
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Articles ACM
- The
Guide
ISI -
Web of
Science
Springer
Link
Sum % Off
Total articles 1730 1201 502 3433 -
Articles pre-
processed
1232 822 486 2540 -26%
Articles selected by
Title and Abstract
111 69 30 210 -75.5%
Primary Studies 27 20 12 59 -71.9%
TABLE II: Papers’ selection steps
It is worth noting that the SLR has been run through two iterations. During the first iteration, only 14 of the 39
pilot studies could be found by the systematic protocol. We carefully refined the search string and the web search
engines (that are those presented above) in order to improve the coverage of pilot studies. Eventually, 23 of the 39
pilot studies could be found through the SLR.
In the end, 75 papers were selected for our study: 59 coming from the SLR, plus 16 more that were selected in
the ad-hoc review (but not included in the SLR primary studies). The selected papers are listed in Appendix A.
To avoid having to classify different published versions of essentially the same research, we grouped all papers
written by the same authors within the same research framework into what we call approaches. Figure 1 lists the 44
approaches we used to group the 75 selected papers. The table reports the approach number, the papers pertaining
to a certain approach, and their main keywords (the most relevant being in bold).
D. Threats To Validity
According to [40], “threats to validity are influences that may limit our ability to interpret or draw conclusions
from the studys data.”. Three main threats shall be considered: construct, internal, and external validity.
Construct Validity. Construct validity refers to the relevance of the studied parameters with respect to the research
questions [41]. In order to maximize the construct validity we carefully tested our systematic review protocol and
its search string. Starting from the research questions described in Section III-C, we defined an initial protocol and
search string (presented in [42]). Accordingly, we initially run a pilot study and successively checked the ability of
our search string to select relevant papers (i.e., those identified during the ad-hoc review). As discussed in [42], we
revised our protocol and search string in order to maximize the coverage. The final search string has been carefully
analyzed by the two co-authors, plus a colleague of us (Patricia Lago) working on the software architecture domain.
Moreover, since both the ad-hoc and the systematic review have been designed and executed by the same persons,
the chance of misinterpreting theoretical concepts is minimized.
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Fig. 1. Surveyed Approaches
Internal Validity. Internal threats to validity are mostly related to bias introduced by the study designers and/or
executors. In this work, the ad-hoc and the systematic review have been conducted by both co-authors, with the
support of an external expert on systematic reviews (Patricia Lago) and of a master student (Andrea Florio). A
review protocol has been carefully defined in order to minimize the chance of a bias. Precise inclusion and exclusion
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criteria, as well as research questions and study selection criteria have been defined. The review protocol has been
carefully designed by the co-authors. Then, the review protocol has been executed by both co-authors (the first
co-author being running the first stages, and complemented by the other co-author in the latest stages).
With respect to the design of the systematic review, a potential threat may affect our results. In fact, we cannot
guarantee that a paper relevant to our review is always selected. While we tested and improved the protocol and
the search string, and we had a colleague of us double checking the final search string and review process, it can
still happen that a relevant paper is missing simply because its abstract does not contain the keywords defined in
our search string.
External Validity. External threats to validity relate to how much the results of the study can be generalized
and whether there exist enough evidence. This study includes only academic research papers, peer-reviewed by
researchers in the Computer Science and/or Dependability communities. This study, thus, does not include industrial
approaches for architecting fault tolerant systems. We may assume that solutions, methodologies, and styles identified
by the research community may represent those appearing in industrial contexts. However, since solutions for
architecting fault tolerant systems presented in other forms other than scientific peer-reviews papers were not
considered in our study, the completeness of the results might be threatened.
IV. THE CLASSIFICATION FRAMEWORK
The classification framework proposed in this paper allows to compare the existing proposals for handling fault
tolerance at the software architecture level.
As this survey serves two distinct and usually loosely related communities (namely, those of software architecture
and fault tolerance), the classification framework proposed here takes into consideration two main viewpoints: the
perspective of a software architect, who is interested in modelling fault tolerance concepts at the architectural level
and wants to learn how to architect a fault tolerant system; and that of a fault tolerance specialist, who wants to
learn how traditional low-level fault tolerance techniques can be applied at the architectural level. Our classification
framework is therefore built around two respective types of parameters.
Starting with the set of research papers selected in Section III, this survey will classify each of them with respect
to each of the two sets of parameters. Since the domain of architecting fault tolerant systems is an emerging area, it is
only natural that it heavily relies on the concepts inherited from its ancestors. The decision to use both classifications
was driven by the fact that the two communities have different vocabularies, expertise, domain specific knowledge,
and ontologies; the survey is thus intended to provide a useful reference framework for both communities, yet
without requiring specialised knowledge in both domains. While keeping the two sets of parameters separate may
not seem the natural choice, our work on the survey has convinced us that this is a useful approach as it captures the
features of the surveyed approaches which are non-overlapping and orthogonal. Bringing together the two sets of
parameters creates a powerful common language which can be understood by researchers from both communities.
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Fig. 2. Software Architecture Viewpoint
A. Classification Parameters from a Software Architecture Viewpoint
As outlined in Section II-A, software architecture specifies the high-level structure and behaviour of interacting
components. Research on software architecture mainly investigates how to model an architecture, how the
architectural specification can be analysed and then used for generating the application skeletal code, architectural
styles and architecture-based software processes. The first set of parameters proposed in this work allows examination
of how the existing approaches for architecting fault tolerant systems cover the main core concepts in software
architecture. The selected software architecture parameters are described below and illustrated in Figure 2:
• SA Elements. As outlined in Section II-A, a software architecture is typically represented as an assembly of
constituting elements, such as components and connectors, linked via interfaces.
The classification framework will investigate how the main architectural elements, that is components,
connectors and channels, and interfaces, have been enhanced, extended, adapted or revised by
the existing approaches in order to tolerate faults.
• SA Specification. As thoroughly discussed in many papers (e.g., [17], [43]) a software architecture can be
specified through formal languages, model-based notations and box-and-line sketches.
The classification framework will identify what kinds of notation are used in the existing approaches for
specifying FT SA, focusing on formal and UML-based notations.
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• Analysis. A software architecture is designed in order to meet certain quality requirements. To this end, a range
of analysis techniques have been proposed to allow software engineers to assess the software architecture and
to evaluate its quality with respect to these requirements (e.g., [16], [44]). Model and consistency checking,
testing, simulation, performance analysis and deadlock analysis are the most investigated analysis techniques
at the architectural level.
The classification framework will cover the most common analysis techniques applied to fault tolerant
architectures.
• Code Generation. A software architecture usually acts a bridge connecting the requirement phase to the system
implementation. As long as the architectural model complies with certain quality expectations, it may be used
to drive low-level design and to generate (skeletal) code.
The classification framework will identify the approaches which support skeletal code generation from FT
architecture specifications.
• Run-Time. Traditionally, software architectures have been specified as unchangeable artefacts. Recently,
however, the focus has been shifting to dynamically evolving architectures, capable of adapting during the
system execution (e.g., self-adaptive, self-repairing, service-oriented architectures).
The framework will analyse how the principles of and solutions for building dynamic and evolvable architectures
have been used to enhance ways of tolerating faults at the architectural level.
• FT Software Process. Software architecture is an important phase in a typical software engineering development
process, which needs to be strongly connected to requirements, low-level design and implementation.
The framework will highlight how FT SA models presented in the surveyed papers are integrated in a more
generic FT software development process.
• FT Style. According to [45], an architectural style is “a set of design rules that identify the kinds of components
and connectors that may be used to compose a system or subsystem, together with local or global constraints
on the way the composition is done”. There have been a number of architectural styles proposed: client-server,
pipe-and-filter, layered, blackboard, C2, and many others.
This framework will identify and discuss new architectural styles introduced for dealing with FT architectures.
• Tool Support. Developing tools for supporting the specification, analysis, and implementation of fault tolerant
software architectures is an important contribution to bridging the gap between academic research and industrial
practice.
Our framework will identify the tools made available by the surveyed approaches, enabling automated support
for specifying, analysing and implementing FT architectures.
B. Classification Parameters from the Fault Tolerance Viewpoint
This section defines a set of fault tolerance parameters used for classification and comparison of the existing
approaches, summarised in Figure 3. All solutions under consideration explicitly deal with faults and/or errors by
applying specialised fault tolerance mechanisms at the architectural level. These techniques are to be applied by the
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Fig. 3. Fault Tolerance Viewpoint
architects as part of system development. The choice of the solution depends on the types of faults which can and
need to be represented at the architectural level, on the fault tolerance requirements and on the redundant resources
which are included during architectural design.
• Fault assumptions. A clear statement of fault assumptions is in the core of fault tolerance as they define
both the faults to be tolerated by a specific fault tolerance mechanism and the faults which can never happen
during system execution. Correct system execution includes the execution of the fault tolerance mechanism
and as such defines the foundation on which the mechanism is built. Fault assumptions are crucial in choosing
the fault tolerance mechanism to be applied. Typical examples of fault assumptions are hardware faults,
software design faults, environmental faults, operator mistakes and interaction
faults.
In this survey fault assumptions define the types of faults that the proposed architectural solutions are designed
to tolerate. These assumptions are typically expressed in terms of the architectural level at which we reason
about the systems, i.e. in terms of components, connectors and configurations (e.g. failures of the individual
components and connectors, and architectural component mismatches).
• Origins of the software architecture solution. Development of various fault tolerance techniques at the design
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and implementation levels has been an active area of research since mid-60s.
All fault tolerance techniques developed for the software architecture level originate from these known
techniques. The framework will place each architectural solution in the context of the original fault tolerance
techniques, such as software diversity (N-version programming and recovery blocks), exception
handling (Idealised FT component model and Coordinated Atomic actions),
replication, etc.
• Steps of fault tolerance. The three steps of fault tolerance are error detection, error handling and
fault handling (see Section II-B).
Every architectural approach discussed in the survey supports techniques of one or more of these types. The
paper will describe each of them in these terms.
• Error detection. Fault tolerance always starts with detecting erroneous conditions.
When the discussed architectural solution provides error detection, this work will describe where exactly errors
are detected at the architectural level, by which architectural elements and how error detection is conducted.
• Error handling type. There are three general types of error handling: forward error recovery,
backward error recovery andcompensation.
When the proposed architectural approach provides error handling, the paper will explain which type of error
handling it implements.
• Fault handling type. This parameter defines the way in which the proposed mechanism is designed to rid the
system of faults.
The most typical approach to doing this at the architectural level is by reconfiguring the system, e.g. by
removing or replacing the faulty architectural elements.
• Exception handling. Forward error recovery is typically implemented at the application level using appropriate
exception handling mechanisms. Exception handling is the most general and effective approach to recovering
from errors.
When the proposed architectural approach employs forward error recovery this work will analyse it using
specific parameters developed for comparing exception handling mechanisms at the architectural level. These
parameters have been defined by building on our previous classifications of exception handing mechanisms in
programming [46] and include the following: (i) where exceptions are defined (e.g. the component interfaces,
configuration), (ii) what exception handlers do, (iii) where handlers are attached, (iv) how exceptions are
propagated, (v) which continuation model is used (resumption or termination), (vi) how the approach deals
with concurrent exceptions, and (vii) what functions as exception handling scopes.
• Error confinement and recovery domain. A clear understanding of the domain of the overall system state which
can be affected by an error is crucial for the success of recovery. Some fault tolerance solutions clearly define
such domains and ensure error confinement, whereas others rely on a set of assumptions or impose a set of
rules for programmers to follow in order to guarantee that errors are always contained.
This work will clearly identify the error confinement and recovery domain for each approach surveyed, doing
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this in software architecture terms. Some of the examples of the structuring units of error confinement and
error recovery are a component, an action involving several cooperating components, a connector, an
architectural level exception handling scope, etc. For each approach, the architectural elements involved in
recovery will be defined.
• Multilevel recovery. Fault tolerance needs to be recursive and to rely on recursive system structuring. This is
crucial for localising recovery and reducing the overall system complexity. Multilevel recovery can be achieved
by creating nested scopes or multiple system layers.
Where appropriate, this paper will discuss how the proposed architectural approaches achieve multilevel
recovery.
• Type of redundancy. All fault tolerance mechanisms use redundancy.
For each solution the paper will identify the type of redundancy employed in terms of software architecture.
The typical examples of redundancy are replicated component, additional connectors and components, extended
component interfaces, etc.
V. PARAMETERS BY PARAMETERS VIEW: SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE VIEWPOINT
This section analyses how surveyed approaches for handling FT SAs can be categorised in terms of the
classification framework which captures the software architecture viewpoint, proposed in Section IV-A. Figure 4
summarises the classification results.
A. SA Elements
Software architectures describe software systems as consisting of components, connectors and interfaces required
to glue the various architectural elements together. To make individual constituting elements, a set of them, and/or
the entire architecture tolerant to faults, architectural elements are extended, enhanced or revised. This section
will analyse how architectural elements are revised in order to manage fault tolerance at the architectural level. It
is composed of three subsections: Section V-A1 focuses on components, Section V-B analyses connectors, while
Section V-B1 shows how interfaces have been used in FT architectures.
1) Components in Fault-tolerant Architectures: Introducing components with fault tolerance features at the
architectural level is the solution adopted in many of the surveyed approaches - see Figure 4. The overall idea
is to enhance the traditional concept of component in order to make it more resistant to faults or capable to
manage exceptions internally. A great variety of proposals have been put forward that can be categorised into
four major classes, based on the use of idealised fault-tolerant components5, redundant and diverse components,
domain-specific components, and dedicated types of components.
5In this study idealised fault-tolerant component/connector will be used to refer to what is sometimes called ideal and sometimes idealised
component/connector
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Fig. 4. The Software Architecture Viewpoint Classification
Idealised Fault-tolerant Components. The solution adopted by some of the papers in this category adapts the ideal
fault- tolerant model [34] for building components with well-defined fault-tolerant (exceptional) interfaces and
clearly separated fault tolerance component behaviours. This solution is implemented in A17, A19, A23, A24,
A30 and A32, for a variety of purposes. Offering the most comprehensive treatment of the subject, A17 is the
most representative approach in the set. In the A17 papers, a C2 [47] component6 is replaced with an idealised C2
component (iC2C), and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software components are put into protective wrappers
in order to create idealised C2 COTS components (iCOTS). The concept of idealised fault-tolerant component is
6A C2 component is a generic architectural element that needs to meet certain structural and communication constraints, as defined in the
C2 architectural style
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used in approaches A19, A23, and A24 to incorporate exception handling in all phases of software development,
to test fault-tolerant architectures, and to define idealised fault-tolerant elements, respectively. Approach A30 uses
a different implementation of a fault-tolerant component (called FTComponent): an FTComponent may run
in parallel with other FTComponents and may compete for shared resources. Exceptions concurrently raised
by different FTComponents are managed by a coordinating component. In Approach A32 fault-tolerant objects
(used to represent components) have to adhere to the standard interface characteristics of an idealised fault-tolerant
component.
Using Redundant and Diverse Components. A large number of the approaches include fault tolerance features into
components using some form of redundancy or diversity. These are A01, A02, A08, A14, A18, A26, A38 and A40.
All of them use redundant components. A01 uses analytic redundancy so that each component is internally
composed of high-assurance and high- performance subsystems. In A02 different versions of the existing
components are run in parallel, and this diversity is used to ensure system reliability during both system execution
and upgrade. A08 stores components with similar characteristics (therefore replaceable) in a redundant component
array (RAIC). A RAIC controller handles the dynamic updating of components, supporting a variety of fault
tolerance strategies. A18 uses the RAIC concept proposed in A08 in order to design middleware that supports
exception handling. A14 uses COTS component replication and majority voting for error detection and masking.
A26 uses fault tolerant components with a crash failure semantics by employing various redundant/diverse
components and decider components (for adjudicating or voting). In A38 architectural components (and more
generally, elements) can have a redundancy schema attached to make them fault-tolerant. This is done using
redundancy schemas, so that elements behave as fault-tolerant units. A40 introduces components called AQuA and
Proteus, which are composed of replicated dependability managers and object factories. These are replicated, and
groups of objects are created to manage a fault-tolerant architecture.
Domain-Specific Components. In certain approaches, domain- specific concepts (such as objects, web services and
actors) are treated as fault-tolerant components; these are A28, A34, A35, A41, A42, A44 and A45.
In A34, A41 and A45 various types of (or abstractions of) objects are used to specify fault-tolerant components.
In A34 a fault-tolerant element is a large-grain object (i.e. a component). In A41 the concept of object group, an
abstraction introduced to ensure replication and failure transparency, is applied to provide a replication of CORBA
objects. The metalevel architecture approach presented in A45 uses fault tolerance metaobject classes to describe
fault-tolerant architectural components.
A28 extends the SOA metamodel proposed in [48], adding six types of components to introduce fault tolerance
mechanisms into service-oriented architectures. In A35 local programs (which may be executed on several
processors) are extended to become components, each associated with an interface. In A42, a web service is seen
as a component which implements two extra interfaces to make the web service fault-tolerant. A44 proposes the
use of actors (formally defined in an algebra of actors) to describe architectural components with crash failures
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mechanisms.
Dedicated Components. This section will focus on approaches in which a set of dedicated components (types) are
introduced to make the overall architecture fault-tolerant. These are A05, A15, A20, A31, A32 and A39.
In A05, four different components are presented to describe a generic software architecture that integrates
sequential and concurrent exception handling: Exception, Handler, Exception Handling Strategy and Concurrent
Exception Handling Action. The MAMA (model for availability management architectures) model put forward in
A15 considers four types of components: application tasks, agent tasks, manager tasks and processors. In A20 four
types of component are used to implement a crash-failure semantics and fault tolerance in Web Services. A31 uses
user-defined and built-in components and channels for the specification of concurrent fault-tolerant systems. Three
main types of component are considered: the participant, coordinator and the external one. The coordinator and
external components are built-in and thus pre-defined, and used for exception handling coordination; by contrast,
the participant component is user- defined, but includes built-in components.
In A32 a multi-level reference architecture for structuring fault- tolerant architectures is presented. This is
composed of four layers: the application, system support, low system and OS levels, with each layer consisting
of types of component specific to it. A39 proposes an information architecture for power systems, whose main
components are the operations control centre and the distribution substations, connected by diverse fault-tolerant
configurations.
In a class of their own, approaches A03 and A04 extend the traditional definition of component specification. In
A03 components (as well as connectors) can raise exceptions; the “configuration exceptions” specification describes
conditions that lead to occurrences of exceptions. A similar approach is taken in A04, where local handlers are
attached to the component that raises the exception.
B. Connectors in Fault-tolerant Architectures
Software connectors have also been used to make architectures fault-tolerant. Similarly to the classification
above, connectors used in fault-tolerant architectures can be grouped into idealised fault- tolerant connectors,
redundant and diverse connectors, domain-specific connectors and dedicated connectors.
Idealised Fault-tolerant Connectors. Approaches A17, A24, and A30 introduce idealised fault-tolerant connectors
by defining specific fault-tolerant connectors to connect the normal and abnormal parts of a set of idealised
fault-tolerant components. A17 introduces specialised C2 connectors called IC2C bottom, IC2C internal and
IC2C top, and rules concerning how normal and exceptional information flows through them. For systems using
COTS components, another two connectors have been introduced (upper detector and lower detector) to connect
a COTS component with that responsible for handling abnormal activities. A24 introduces the concept of idealised
fault-tolerant architectural element, allowing for subsequent instantiation of idealised fault-tolerant components and
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connectors. A30 uses connectors to connect an out_port of one FTComponent with an in_port of another
FTComponent.
Using Redundant and Diverse Connectors. Approaches A03, A07, A26, A39, A40 and A47 use redundant and
diverse connectors to architect fault-tolerant systems. A03 proposes enriching connector specifications with explicit
exception specification and handlers. A07 defines the concept of multi-versioning connector (MVC): an MVC
is essentially a wrapper (similar to that in A17 for software components) that contains different versions of
certain components, and is used to monitor the execution of several versions, to record the history of version
execution and to dynamically remove less reliable versions or replace an old version with a new one. A26 uses
halt-on-failure connectors to link redundant halt-on-failure components. The architecture proposed in A39 uses
redundant communication links, implemented using various communication technologies for achieving redundancy.
The AQuA architecture in A40 uses a set of Gateway connectors to provide fault tolerance by implementing
various communication schemes and replication protocols. An AQuA gateway is responsible for finding a set of
replicated objects that can implement a request, pass them the parameters, invoke their methods, and return the
results. A Gateway is a complex connector composed of a naming service object, a handler factory (static and
dynamic), a DII processor, and handlers for AQuA objects. A47 proposes a ”Specific Fault-tolerant Connector”.
It is implemented as a specialised component that can capture Web Service interactions and perform built-in FT
actions (assertions, recovery, monitoring). These connectors can use identical or equivalent service replicas available.
Domain-Specific Connectors. There is only one approach, A45, which uses domain-specific connectors. It proposes
a metalevel architecture that runs metaobject protocols; these act as connectors between objects and metaobjects.
Dedicated Connectors. Approaches A09, A15, A21 and A48 use sets of connector types in order to manage fault
tolerance at the architectural level. A09 uses co-operative connectors to represent collaborative activities between
components. A co-operative connector integrates the concepts of conversations and transactions, and ensures that
information is confined to localise the impact of a change. The model for availability management architectures
(MAMA), which is put forward in A15, considers three different types of connectors: alive-watch, status-watch and
notify. A21 proposes using complex connectors that are composed of an Application and a Configuration component,
and an Integrator connector. The PRISM-MW architectural middleware in A48 allows the architect to define different
types of FTConnector. Two types of FTConnector are defined in the paper: the BestEffortFTConnector,
which enables the synchronisation of all active backups, and the RealTimeFTConnector, to be used when a
shorter response time to the client is crucial.
1) Interfaces in FT Architectures: Some of the surveyed papers introduce dedicated interfaces to support
the architecting of fault-tolerant systems, as shown in Figure 4. These can be grouped into two major classes:
interfaces for idealised fault-tolerant components and domain-specific interfaces.
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Interfaces for Idealised Fault-tolerant Components. In defining an idealised fault-tolerant component, approaches
A21, A24 and A32 introduce certain interfaces which involve required or provided access points to the normal
or abnormal parts of the idealised component. A21, for example, uses two main interfaces, the Application
services and the Configuration services, in order to keep a clear distinction between architectural representation
and reconfiguration, and to reflect the fact that this architecture consists of the Application and Configuration
components. A24 defines two provided and two required interfaces to external services and exceptions. A32
extends what is done in the approaches discussed above by including two new interfaces: the exceptional responses
interface to deal with degraded services, and the abort exceptions to notify the environment about a successful
state restoration after a fault.
Domain-Specific Interfaces. A05, A26, A40-42 and A47 introduce domain-specific interfaces. In A05, the software
architecture proposed for sequential and concurrent exception handling includes five different interfaces. The
Exception component implements three public interfaces: the IRaising, IGetInformation and IUpdateInformation.
The Handler component implements the private interface IInvocation, while the Exception Handling Strategy
component conforms to the private interface ISearcher. Finally, the Concurrent Exception Handling Action
component implements the public interface ICooperation. In A26, the HoFE (Halt-on Failure Element) abstraction
defines two types of interfaces: the I HoFE Prov, which determines a set of operations provided by the HoFE,
and the I HoFE Req, which specifies operations required by the HoFE for implementing its behaviour. In A40,
there are three types of interfaces between the Dependability Manager in AQuA and other components in the
AQuA architecture: the interface with the QoS Observer/Requester, the interface with the Advisor Observer, and
the interface to the Host Observer/Controller components. A41 discusses the types of interface supported by FT
CORBA implementations. In A42 the interface of a web service is extended to deal with checkpointing and rollback
management. In A47 interfaces are generated from the definitions of the abstract operations of Web Services. The
concept of Web Service equivalence is introduced to allow several valid interfaces to be generated from the equivalent
Web Services.
C. SA Specification
Formal languages and model-based notations (such as UML - Unified Modelling Language) are the main means
to formally or semi-formally specify a software architecture. Formal languages may be general purpose or designed
specifically to describe software architectures (in which case they are referred to as Architecture Description
Languages - ADLs). This section will first present an analysis of formal languages used to describe FT SA,
and then UML-based notations, based on the parameters identified in Figure 2.
1) Formal Specifications: FT architectures are formally described using ADLs or general purpose formal
languages.
Formal Description using ADLs. Approaches A01, A17 and A25 use or extend existing ADLs. A01 uses the
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WRIGHT ADL (as is) to model the SIMPLEX architecture for dependable and evolvable process-control software-
intensive systems. In A17, the Idealised C2 Component model is introduced and specified by extending the C2
architectural language. A25 uses the ACME architectural language to specify the architectural model.
Approaches A03 and A15, instead, define new ADLs, specifically designed for specifying fault-tolerant
architectures. A03 extends a generic architectural language with constructs to model exceptions and their handlers.
This approach can be applied to any existing ADL. A15 defines a new ADL called MAMA-dl, which combines a
language for describing MAMA fault management architectures with a Fault-Tolerant Layered Queueing Network
specification.
General Purpose Formal Specification Languages. Approaches A09, A14, A16, A22, A24, A26, A30, A31, A35,
A44, A46, A47 and A48 use general purpose formal languages to describe fault-tolerant architectures.
A16, A24 and A26 use the formal B-Method, which supports state- based system specification by defining various
types through mathematical sets. A16 uses the B-Method to specify a layered system. Abstract specifications are
refined so as to smoothly incorporate reasoning about fault tolerance into the software development process. Both
A24 and A26 combine the B-Method (to specify architectural elements, interfaces and exception types) and the
CSP algebra (to specify architectural scenarios).
Approaches A24, A26, A31 and A44 use a process algebraic formal language (the CSP algebra in case of the
first three). While A24 and A26 combine a CSP specification with the B-Method, A31 uses the CA Actions to
structure normal and exceptional behaviours, employing CSP to combine behaviours for both user-defined and
built-in components and channels. A44 extends an algebra of actors with mechanisms to model and detect crash
failures (of actors). Primitives, such as the ping statement, are added for this purpose. An extended algebra of this
type is used to specify distributed software architectures.
Some papers in A24 and A46 use specification languages (UPPAAL and Promela, respectively) intended for the
specification and checking of reactive systems. In A24 the general architecture of iFTE, defined as its components,
connectors and their interactions, is specified in UPPAAL using extended timed automata: the interactions between
architectural elements are assumed to be blocking request/reply, and represented as synchronous channels. A
formal Promela model of a FT architecture is proposed in A46; this is model-checked with the SPIN model checker.
In A14 the Stochastic Activity Networks, a variant of Stochastic Petri Nets with a graphical representation, are
used to model the proposed methodology for handling multiple classes of faults in COTS- and Legacy- based
applications. A22 uses the Modal Action Logic specification language to specify components in terms of attributes,
actions and axioms. The Modal Action Logic specification is then systematically translated into finite state models,
by extending the LTSA approach and the FSP algebra [49]. A30 makes use of Object-Z, a formal language based
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on set theory and predicate logic, to describe an FTA. Such specification includes global types, FTComponent,
Connector, CoordinatingComponent, ShareResource, and FTSystem class schemas. In A35 the architecture of
component-based distributed software is defined by a logical graph. A47 defines DeWel, a Dependable Web service
Language, to specify connectors for unreliable Web Services. A48 introduces DeSi, a visual environment that
supports the specification, analysis and manipulation of a distributed software system deployment architecture.
Approach A09 makes use of extended time automata diagrams in order to specify the behaviour of architectural
components.
2) UML-Based Specifications: Model-based notations based on the UML are used in approaches A11, A19,
A23, A24, A26, A33, A38, A45 and A46.
Different sets of UML models have been used in different approaches. UML Class, Sequence Diagrams
and Activity diagrams are used throughout the entire life-cycle to model fault tolerance from requirements to
architectural and low-level design in A19. Component and State diagrams are used in A23 to specify normal and
exceptional behaviour. A24 and A26 make use of (stereotyped) Component and Sequence diagrams to describe
the four main idealised fault-tolerant architectural elements (iFTEs), enforcing the principles associated with
the ideal fault-tolerant component model. A38 uses a UML profile to define ADL components, connectors and
configurations with their stimuli, general and redundancy properties.
Approaches A11, A33, and A46 take a slightly different view. A11 is a model-driven engineering approach to
architecting fault-tolerant systems. The approach uses a UML-based notation for modelling Coordinated Atomic
actions and an MDA development support tool. Defining the strategies to be used for making the SA fault-tolerant,
aspect-oriented modelling and model weaving in A33 are used to link a base model (i.e., the architecture without
fault tolerance means) with the selected fault tolerance patterns, both specified using UML stereotyped diagrams.
The integrated architecture and dependability models generated with the application of model weaving are
represented as UML diagrams. In A46 fault-tolerant architectures conforming to selected FT styles are drawn using
UML profiles. Component diagrams are used to describe both FT styles and FT architectures. Sequence diagrams
are used to describe how FT components behave according to a FT style.
Approach A45 presents a model-based notation, not based on UML. It makes use of static and dynamic diagrams,
taken from the Business Object Notation domain, to describe system classes and metaobjects (i.e., components),
and their relationships and composition; dynamic diagrams represent the system behaviour in terms of exchanged
messages.
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D. Analysis
An interesting body of work has been developed to propose techniques for analysing fault-tolerant architectures.
The analysis techniques in the surveyed approaches appear to belong to several areas: model and consistency
checking, testing, simulation, performance analysis, deadlock analysis, and others.
1) Model and Consistency Checking: Model and consistency checking of FT SA is addressed in approaches
A01, A09, A22, A24, A25, A26, A28 and A46 (and partially in A02 and A33).
A variety of model-checking engines have been used for model and consistency checking in the above approaches.
The CSP-FDR model-checking engine has been used to validate the SIMPLEX architecture compliance to selected
requirements in A01. The UPPAAL model checker is used in both A09 and A24. In A09 the safety of the normal
and abnormal system behaviour is analysed by checking the co-operative architecture using timed automata and
the UPPAAL model checker. A24 models idealised fault-tolerant elements in the UPPAAL language, and their
correctness is verified by the UPPAAL model checker. The Labelled Transition System Analyser (LTSA) model
checker is used in A22 for formal SA specification and model checking. The ProB model checker is used by both
A24 and A26. A24 proposes a systematic verification and validation process, enabling the consistency checking
of the formal B-Method model, the verification of general and specific abnormal scenarios violations, and the
verification of user-defined properties. A26 enables the formal verification of iFTE and HoFE FT architectures,
making it possible to identify behavioural inconsistencies, and assessing the consistency of interactions between
architectural elements. Alloy [50], the modelling and analysis language created by Daniel Jackson, is used in
A25 for validating the software architecture and exception model specified in the ACME architecture description
language. The normal architectural specification is enriched with an exception flow view; the model thus developed
is then converted to Alloy and submitted to Alloy analysis. The Bogor model checker is used in A28 for analysing
FT SOA architectures. The SPIN model checker is employed in A46 for analysing whether and to what extent
a fault-tolerant architecture which follows a particular fault-tolerant style satisfies both generic and application
specific properties.
In A02 the Constraint Evaluator component is used to analyse the component version output with respect to
domain constraints. A33 introduces a dependability model (obtained by model weaving of a normal architecture
with FT strategies) to be used for analysis purposes.
2) Testing: Testing techniques are applied in approaches A08, A19, A23, A24 and A26.
The most relevant work is found in A19, A24 and A26. All of them provide unit testing strategies. A24 and
A26 also provide integration testing of fault-tolerant architectures. A19 presents the MDCE+ methodology aimed
at defining unit testing of the exceptional activities in component-based software systems. Testing and development
activities are run in parallel in the development process. A24 performs unit, integration, and scenario-based
testing at various levels of abstractions, and uses a grey-box testing strategy. A formal representation of the
iFTE (idealised Fault-tolerant Element) is used to generate an execution sequence graph used for testing. A
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scenario-based strategy also allows the generation of both unit and integration test cases for specific behaviour
related to either functionalities or error handling. In A26, unit and integration testing is generated for HoFE
architectures: unit test cases are produced for each HoFE, while integration test cases are generated to identify any
mismatches between the architectural elements. Architectural scenario-based robustness testing is also introduced
for testing single failures and stressful conditions.
A23 deals with conformance testing of the system implementation with respect to fault tolerance requirements.
Just-in-time testing is applied to the architecture of redundant arrays of independent components in A08.
E. Performance Analysis
Performance analysis is applied in A15 (and partially in A01). In A15, the MAMA model is transformed
into a knowledge propagation graph, and the Fault-Tolerant Layered Queuing Network (FTLQN) model into a
fault propagation graph. Certain performability algorithms are then used to analyse these graphs to compute the
architecture expected reward rate. In the Simplex architecture proposed in approach A01, hardware and software
fault tolerance is ensured by using analytic redundancy which combines two software versions, a high-assurance
and a high-performance one. The architecture provides a guarantee of the existing level of performance in case of
software failure.
F. Simulation
Model simulation is briefly discussed in A14 and A48 (and analysed in related work). In A14 fault tolerance
modelling is conducted using Stochastic Activity Networks which are simulated by employing the MOBIUS tool.
The XTEAM environment, a suite of architecture description language extensions and transformations, implements
a reliability estimation technique by simulating each single component. The output is used by the Desi’s replication
decision algorithms in A48.
G. Others
Analysis techniques proposed in other approaches include monitoring (A01, A07, and A13), mismatch and
compositional analysis (A10, A12), dependency analysis (A24), proofs (A30), and reliability (A39).
Monitoring of fault-tolerant architectures is described in A13, and partially in A01 and A07. A13 describes
how the Lira framework monitoring and reconfiguration capabilities can be used for monitoring critical events
(including system errors and component failures) and reconfiguring the component-based system accordingly. In
A01 monitoring techniques are employed to establish whether a run-time change in the Simplex architecture is
safe or not. In A07 a specialised Multi-Version Connector monitors the execution of several components’ versions,
collects the history of version execution and dynamically removes less reliable versions or replaces the old version
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with the new one.
Mismatch and compositional analysis are performed in A10 and A12 respectively. A10 proposes an approach
for tolerating mismatches by using error detection and system recovery. In A12 the authors focus on component
integration and misbehaviours caused by dependencies violation. They use self-adaptation to recover the system
from misbehaviours.
Dependency analysis is used in A24 to support the testing phase. More specifically, dependency analysis is
used to impose an order on how components are integrated, thus facilitating fault localisation. Three types of
dependency chains are considered: affected-by, affects, and related. A dependency matrix is used to represent the
relationships among architectural elements.
The proof process is used in A30 to demonstrate that fault-tolerant properties of FTA are satisfied. This is done
through the Object-Z reasoning rules.
A39 considers various configurations of the power system information architecture. Their reliability analysis
shows that the different solutions employed in the approach provide very similar reliability results.
H. Code Generation
Among the surveyed approaches A03, A11, A17, A19 and A24 provide support for code generation starting
from a fault-tolerant architectural specification. Each of them presents an initial stage and prototypal tools.
A11, A19 and A24 share the use of Java as a reference programming language for the earlier specified fault-
tolerant SA.
A11 introduces the CORRECT MDA approach together with the CAA-DRIP [51] framework, for automatically
generating Java skeletal code from Coordinated Atomic actions. In A19 the authors propose an exception handling
mechanism (at the implementation level) to support an explicit separation of normal and exceptional activities; the
Java programming language is used to implement components, while the meta- object protocol (MOP) is proposed
to implement the functions of the exception mechanisms. While the code generation phase is not automated, the
authors offer clear directions as how to implement normal and exceptional behaviours defined in the fault-tolerant
SA. Java and MOP are also used in A24, where a normal class signals an exception, which is intercepted by the MOP
that will find an adequate exception handler in the exceptional class of this component. The exceptional classes
are hierarchically organized, allowing subclasses to inherit handlers from their superclasses and, consequently,
permitting the reuse of exceptional code.
A03 introduces an initial version of the Aster prototype. It supports the systematic mapping of architectures to
their implementation using a middleware-based solution. The run-time support for exception handling is provided
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by three main components running on top of a CORBA-compliant middleware. A17 proposes the FaTC2 object-
oriented framework for implementing the iC2C architecture-level exception handling approach. FaTC2 extends the
Java version of the C2.Fw framework.
I. Run-Time FT & Dynamic Reconfiguration
As illustrated in Figure 4, run-time architectures and dynamic reconfigurations are dealt with in a great deal
of approaches. They can be classified as follows: run-time management via middleware, exception handling for
managing run-time evolution, upgrades, run-time reconfiguration, web services and reflection.
Run-Time Management via Middleware. Approaches A03, A18 and A48 make use of a middleware infrastructure
to deal with the run- time management of fault-tolerant architectures. A03 introduces the Aster environment
aiming at providing an implementation-level support for architecture reconfiguration via a middleware architecture.
The interceptor facility of CORBA is used for enabling component instances reconfiguration. In A18 the authors
propose an approach to exception handling in component composition at the architectural level with the support of
middleware. The middleware monitors the system execution at run-time and enforces the handling of exceptions
(according to an exception model). The approach is based on the PKUAS J2EE-compliant middleware and
makes use of the component array, replacement, replica and reboot mechanisms provided by it. A48 presents the
Prism-MW architectural middleware platform that provides advanced run-time FT facilities (i.e., service discovery,
replication and failover facilities).
Exception Handling for Managing Run-Time Evolution. Approaches A03, A12, and A18 use exception handling
as a means for managing run-time evolution. A03 describes how to extend a generic architecture specification
by introducing a configuration exception specification and exception handlers. When an exception is caught, the
architecture is dynamically reconfigured using the ASTER framework. A12 proposes DeEvolve, a component-based
self-adaptable P2P architecture which extends the traditional concept of adaptation by conducting explicit error
detection and exception handling at the architectural level. The exception handling model in A18 describes when
to handle exceptions and what strategies to employ to do so. The PKUAS J2EE-compliant middleware monitors
the system execution and enforces the handling of exceptions (according to the exception model).
Upgrades. Approaches A01, A02 and A07 consider upgrading systems and their resilience. A01 introduces the
Simplex architecture which ensures system fault tolerance and offers a reliable, safe and easy way of upgrading
a system while it is in operation. Software evolution and change management are the essential aspects of this
approach. A02 proposes the Hercules framework which maintains the previous components versions running in
the course of upgrading the system so as to tolerate errors in the newly introduced version. A07 extends the work
initially proposed in A01 to ensure fault tolerance of a system under upgrade by dynamically connecting old and
new releases of off-the-shelves components.
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Web Services. Approaches A20 and A47 are specific to Web Services. A20 proposes a pattern for improving
web services availability and dynamic reconfiguration. By dealing with architectural elements of four types, this
pattern captures the main functionalities specific to the dynamic composition of Web services. A47 uses the IWSD
(Infrastructure for Web Services Dependability) to provide FT support services to run connectors transparently.
Reflection. Approach A43 analyses the benefits of reflective architecture for implementing adaptivity at the
architectural level (i.e., separation of concerns, flexible support for late binding and intrinsic support for run-time
adaptation). A four-layered reflective architecture for fault tolerance is briefly outlined.
Run-time Reconfiguration. Approaches A03, A13, A21, A22 and A35 consider run-time reconfiguration of fault-
tolerant architectures. In A03 this reconfiguration is a way to handle architecture-level exceptions. In A13 the
system is reconfigured according to monitored data. In A21 reconfiguration is specified using Coordinated Atomic
actions to achieve a clear separation of the application and reconfiguration activities. Approach A22 uses the Modal
Action Logic specification language for specifying and reasoning about dynamically-reconfigurable systems. In
A35, the ComponentGOP framework enables run-time reconfiguration of graph-based architectures for tolerating
faults. Component GOP supports both programmed and ad-hoc dynamic reconfiguration. update primitives. For
ad-hoc reconfiguration, the Configuration Manager component offers the user a way to control the execution of
a component-based distributed system. Crash detection and system reconfiguration are implemented as part of
ComponentGOP. The Consistency Maintenance component is responsible for ensuring the component-based system
consistency during dynamic reconfiguration.
J. FT Software Process
Ways of enforcing a fault-tolerant architecture in the software life-cycle are analysed in nine approaches: A04,
A05, A11, A16, A17, A19, A23, A24 and A26. Those approaches can be classified into three major classes:
support for some specific phases in the process, architectural refinement, and V&V process.
Support for some Specific Phases in the Process. Approaches A04, A05, A19 and A23 link the fault-tolerant
architecting phase with other software development phases. A04 and A05 both focus on two main software
development phases: architectural and low-level design. In A04 a software architecture for developing dependable
systems is presented (based on two architectural styles and introducing atomicity, exception handling and
coordinated error recovery at the architectural level) and then refined through a set of design patterns. A05 provides
a systematic approach to incorporating exception handling during the detailed design stage by refining (through
design patterns) the general components of the proposed architecture. The Exception, Handler, Exception Handling
Strategy and Concurrent Exception Handling Action patterns are presented in order to map architectural decisions
and exception handling guidelines at the low- level design. A19 covers the entire software development process,
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from requirements to code. This approach focuses on how to specify normal and exceptional requirements, how
to use this information to drive the component specification and design phase, and how to implement the system
using a Java-based framework. The proposed software process is based on the Catalysis process. (A05 applies a
similar strategy to the UML Components Process). A23 starts from Use Case diagrams, detects exceptions from
use cases, and uses this information to guide the architectural design stage.
Architectural Refinement. Approaches A16 and A24 aim at refining abstract architectural specifications into more
detailed ones. A16 proposes a specification pattern that can be recursively applied to formally specify exception
raising and handling at each architectural layer. The goal is to start from an abstract specification in B, the
formal notation in the core of the B method, and then gradually add lower layers by refinement. A24 uses
UML (Component and Sequence diagrams) to specify the FT architecture, and generates B- Method and CSP
specifications. This process extends the MDCE+ process presented in A19.
V&V Process. Approaches A24 and A26 include verification and validation means as an integral part of the
proposed software development process. A24 presents a full process including the specification, verification and
validation of FT architectures described using the iFTE paradigm. The B Method and CSP specifications are
used to drive the verification and validation process (through testing). A26 presents an iterative, recursive and
incremental process for developing fault-tolerant architectures which would also enforce the role of architectural
abstractions. The process is presented in the context of the iFTE and HoFE architectural abstractions: iFTE
implements error handling based on the exception handling mechanism, while HoFE is based on crash failure.
The process considers a UML and a formal specification of the architecture, and its verification through unit and
integration testing.
Other approaches. A11 is a Model Driven Architecture-based approach, in the DRIP Catalyst process, where
Coordinated Atomic actions are specified using a UML-profile, and Java code is generated automatically from this
specification. A17 discusses an exception handling system which adds fault tolerance to component-based systems
at the architectural level. By combining two architectural styles, the iC2C and iCOTS styles are created. The ALEX
framework supports the transition from an architecture modelled according to such styles into Java code.
K. FT Style
Interesting and relevant work has been done in introducing fault tolerance styles and design patterns for
architecting fault-tolerant systems. The existing approaches can be classified into four categories: approaches that
reuse a library of styles or combine the existing styles, domain-specific fault-tolerant styles, styles that support the
idealised fault-tolerant component model and others.
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Approaches that Reuse a Library of Styles or Combine the Existing Styles. These include A04, A17, A30, A33 and
A46.
Approaches A04, A17 and A30 combine existing styles so to architect FT systems. In A04 the Idealised Fault-
Tolerant Component and Role-based Collaboration styles are combined in order to produce a dependable software
architecture. The Exception, Handler, Exception Handling Strategy, Reflective Role and Competitive Collaboration
patterns are used to implement a dependable software architecture. A17 integrates the C2 and the Idealised Fault-
Tolerant Component (IFTC) style in order to create an Idealised C2 Component style. The Fault-tolerant Architecture
(FTA) presented in Approach A30 combines fundamental architectural styles, such as pipe-and-filter, repository and
object- oriented organization.
Approaches A33 and A46 architect FT systems by using a library of existing styles. A33 uses a library of
fault tolerance patterns in order to generate a fault-tolerant architecture. A46 models fault-tolerant mechanisms
as styles by using profiled UML component and sequence diagrams; a library of FT styles is provided, based on
combinations of provided FT components or connectors.
Domain-Specific Fault-tolerant Styles. These are presented in approaches A28, A41 and A42. In A28 the SOA
style is modified in order to add fault tolerance mechanisms to SOA systems. To this end, a SOA metamodel
provided elsewhere is extended. In A41, FT replication styles for FT CORBA are presented. The work focuses
on active and (warm and cold) passive replication. A42 uses a web service (WS) FT style, in which a fault local
to a WS is managed internally, but if the WS is unable to do so the failure is immediately propagated to the
Global Fault Manager. The SOAP layer is extended to provide message logging, replay and acknowledgement
capabilities. A Fault Detector has the responsibility to identify the fault.
Styles that Support the Idealised Fault-tolerant Component Model. These are discussed in approaches A04, A17,
A19, A24 and A32. A04 uses the Idealised Fault-Tolerant Component style (combined with the Role-based
Collaboration styles) in order to produce a dependable software architecture. A17 presents the Idealised C2
Component style, which treats the normal activities in the way it is done in the C2 style and the abnormal activity
according to the IFTC style. A19 proposes a systematic approach to incorporating exception handling in all phases
of software development, from requirement to implementation. At the architecture level, the idealised fault-tolerant
component model style is used to produce a fault-tolerant SA. A24 introduces the Idealised FT architectural
component (iFTComponent), the Idealised FT architectural connector (iFTConnector), and in general, the
Idealised FT architectural element (iFTE). IFTE has its own style which prescribes the way components and
connectors inside it are integrated. A32 proposes an architectural pattern called generic software fault tolerance -
GSFT, which combines the structural characteristics of an idealised fault-tolerant component with the extensibility
and flexibility of an object-oriented approach. This pattern includes an FT interface object, an FT controller, the
software variants and adjudicators abstract classes, and can manage fault tolerance in concurrent systems.
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Other styles. Styles which are not covered by the three categories above are presented in approaches A05, A08,
A09, A16, A20, A25 and A37. A05 presents an exception handling architectural model (composed of four main
components), systematically incorporating exception handling during the detailed design stage by refining the general
components of the proposed architecture through design patterns. The Exception, Handler, Exception Handling
Strategy and Concurrent Exception Handling Action patterns are presented in order to map architectural decisions
and exception handling guidelines at the low-level design. A08 introduces RAIC (redundant arrays of independent
components) as a way to achieve higher dependability and enhance the desirable properties of the component-based
systems. The RAIC architectural style links redundant components and the controller. A09 introduces a co-operative
architectural style to enable component adaptation in evolving dependable systems. A formal specification pattern
that can be recursively applied to formally specify exception raising and handling at each architectural layer is
introduced in A16. A20 proposes an architectural pattern based on two main principles: components implement
crash-failure semantics, and the system supports dynamic reconfiguration. A25 introduces the concept of exceptional
styles. The Aeral framework provides a basic architectural style (expressed in ACME) which can be extended in
order to create new exceptional styles. A37 analyses the impact of certain FT tactics on the architectural pattern. This
approach is different from the others surveyed in that, instead of providing new FT patterns, the authors i)analyse
how several fault-tolerant tactics impact several of the most common architectural patterns, and ii)consider if and
how this information helps software architects to incorporate fault-tolerant measures into the system architecture in
the best possible way.
L. Tool Support
Some of the approaches provide tool support, which serves a variety of purposes. We group the existing tool
support in the following classes: tools for supporting the specification of FT SA, tools for supporting the analysis
of FT SA, and tools for supporting the realisation of FT SA.
Specification. Tools for supporting the specification of FT SA are presented in approaches A11, A15, A16, A19,
A22, A24, A25, A26, A38 and A48.
Approaches A15, A22 and A25 use architecture description languages to provide tool support for the specification
of FT SA. A15 provides a parser which accepts a description of various components (processors, application tasks,
agent and manager tasks), of connectors interconnecting the components in the management architectural view and
of the software functional dependencies as well as relevant performance and reliability definitions as inputs, and
produces the MAMA and FTLQN models as output. A22 makes use of the LTSA7 tool for specifying and reasoning
about dynamically-reconfigurable, multi-component systems with mechanisms for specifying normal and abnormal
behaviour, and recovery actions (fault handling) by reconfiguration. A25 uses the ACMEStudio toolset8 to specify
architectures in the ACME architectural language.
7http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/ltsa/
8http://www.cs.cmu.edu/ acme/AcmeStudio/index.html
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Approaches A16, A24 and A26 use the B method and related tools9 to formally model FT architectures.
While they do not provide their own specific tool, approaches A11, A19, A24, A26 and A38 all provide UML
profiles that are supported by any UML modelling tool.
A48 uses the DeSi visual environment to specify and analyse distributed software system architectures.
Analysis. Tools to support the automated analysis of FT architectures are presented in approaches A01, A09,
A22, A24, A25, A26, A28 and A46. A01 uses the CSP-FDR model-checking engine10 to validate the SIMPLEX
architecture compliance to selected requirements. In A09 and A24 the UPPAAL model checker analyses the safety
of normal and abnormal system behaviours. A22 employs the Labelled Transition System Analyser (LTSA) model-
checking engine associated with the FSP algebraic specification language. A24 and A26 both use the ProB11
model-checking engine. In A28 FT SOA architectures are analysed with the help of the Bogor model checker.
A25 makes use of Alloy [50] for validating the software architecture and exception model specified in the ACME
architecture description language. The SPIN model checker is employed in A46 for examine if and how a fault-
tolerant architecture, written according to a particular fault-tolerant style, satisfies both generic and application
specific properties.
In A15 Layered Queuing Network tools are used to implement performability analysis. A48 refers to the
XTEAM simulation environment for analysing DeSi specifications.
Tools for Supporting the Realisation of FT SA. Java-based support for architecting FT SA is proposed in approaches
A05, A11 and A17. A11 uses the CORRECT tool to automatically generate Java code for the normal and exceptional
behaviours, with the code generation process discussed in detail in [51]. Rather than generating Java code, A05
and A17 make use of Java-based frameworks: A05 presents a Java-based prototype of the proposed exception
handling approach, based on previous work on the Guaran meta-object protocol, while A17 defines the FaTC2 Java
framework, which extends the earlier C2.fw [47] Java framework for dealing with exceptional behaviours.
Frameworks and middleware for architecting fault-tolerant systems are proposed in approaches A03, A13 and
A35. Both A03 and A35 use or extend CORBA. The Aster prototypal middleware in A03 extends the CORBA
middleware in order to deal with exceptional behaviours, while a prototypal implementation of the ComponentGOP
framework in A35 is implemented on top of CORBA, with Java and VisiBroker. As for A13, it builds on top of
the Lira framework for reconfiguration-based fault tolerance in distributed systems.
M. Software Architecture Viewpoint Summary
Figure 5 summarises our analysis from the software architecture viewpoint.
9see, for example, http://www.bmethod.com/php/outils-b- en.php
10http://www.fsel.com/
11http://www.stups.uni- duesseldorf.de/ProB
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Fig. 5. The SA Viewpoint
May 25, 2012 DRAFT
35
• SA elements. The most common ways of extending components and connectors for dealing with fault-tolerant
architectures are idealizing them (by explicitly designing an exceptional component or connector dedicated
to managing exceptional behaviours) or creating redundant and diverse elements (through redundant arrays
of components/connectors, multi-versioned components and connectors, or redundancy schema), or simply
creating architectures from ad hoc components and connectors. It can be seen from this summary that a
fault-tolerant component does not necessarily need to be accompanied by a fault-tolerant connector, or the
other way round. A few of the approaches, however, create specialised interfaces for managing fault-tolerant
architectures. Some of the proposed solutions also involve legacy COTS components, ultimately creating a
fault-tolerant architecture from legacy components which do not tolerate faults.
• SA Specification. Many of the approaches rely on a formal or model-based specification of the fault-tolerant
architecture. Most of the proposed specification languages are based on the existing general- purpose formal
languages or notations (CSP, Stochastic Petri Nets, Queuing Network, the B method, the C2 architectural
language, the Finite State Process algebra, Acme). A few Architecture Description Languages are, however,
used as is or adapted for specifying fault-tolerant architectures. This seems to suggest that most of this work
has been conducted by researchers who tend to be closer to the fault tolerance community rather than the
architectural one. This is partially confirmed by looking at the authors’ backgrounds and where the papers are
published. It is also worth noting that while model-based specifications of software architectures are widely
used in practice today, most of the existing notations for dealing with fault-tolerant architectures are still based
on formal languages. In most cases, model-based specifications rely on UML, and more specifically on UML
profiles built for including fault tolerance concepts into traditional UML diagrams.
• Analysis. Creating a fault-tolerant architecture is not the only issue; analysing its correctness and consistency
is important as well. As shown in this study, many approaches carefully check the architecture conformance
to fault-tolerance requirements or properties, or generate test specifications for checking the functional quality
of the architecture developed. Consistency and model checking is the most commonly practised approach to
analysis; these mostly rely on formal specifications of the fault-tolerant architecture. Most of the analysis
techniques also use or adapt the existing analysis engines: the FDR model checker, the UPPAAL model
checker, the LTSA labelled transition system analyser, the Charmy model-checking features, and Alloy. The
focus here is on defining and proving the properties required for the correct functioning of the fault tolerance
mechanism, including the consistency and correctness of the chosen solution. Testing is sometimes conducted
in combination with model checking.
• Code generation. A small number of approaches describe preliminary work on supporting the automated
derivation of source code from fault-tolerant architectures. For a number of reasons, this is a challenging area
of research. Code generation requires a precise and explicit specification of the system architecture, and this is
provided only by a certain number of approaches (note that all the approaches which support code generation
make use of formal or model-based techniques for specifying the fault-tolerant architecture). In general, code
generation driven by architectural specifications is still a fairly underexplored research area. Among more than
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a hundred architectural description languages existing today, only a few (e.g., Fujaba [24], ArchJava [23], and
JavaA [52]) support code generation from the specification of normal (i.e., non-fault tolerant) architectures. It
is thus clear that more research and tools are needed in the fault tolerance domain, for generating fault-tolerant
code from architectural specifications. Our understanding is that only few approaches are mature enough to
be applied in practice.
Two major approaches to code generation use specialised middleware and code generation of Java classes. The
proposed middleware is specialised for targeting architectural level recovery by reconfiguration and systematic
mapping of the architectural solution down to its implementation. In the Java code generation process the
model is transformed into a set of application classes supported by specialised class libraries. All proposals
support exception handling.
• Run-Time. Many approaches deal with fault-tolerant architectures at run-time. Some of them support ar-
chitectural upgrade (i.e., ensuring fault tolerance of system under upgrade by using compensation), while
others implement fault handling by run-time reconfiguration through middleware support, focus on run-
time replacement according to the chosen recovery strategy, or guarantee fault tolerance during system
reconfiguration.
• FT Software Process. Only a few approaches cover the entire process of architecting fault-tolerant systems.
Some approaches describe how a fault-tolerant architecture can guide the low-level design process. Only a
few approaches start from the requirement specification stage, and only one covers the entire process from
requirements specification to coding. The main focus is either on supporting exception handling (including the
idealised fault-tolerant component model and Coordinated Atomic actions) from the requirement to the design
phase, or on defining specialised architectural styles which enforce exception handling and guide the transition
to design.
• FT Style. A considerable number of approaches deal with styles or patterns for architecting fault-tolerant
systems. While some of these specifically propose architectural styles for fault-tolerant systems (such as the
iC2C style and the idealised fault-tolerant style), others employ architectural styles for meta-level architectures,
or focus on creating a bridge between architectural specifications and low level design by using architectural
and design patterns. Some of the research conducted aims to introduce co-operative architectural styles for
defining error recovery that involves several components.
• Tool Support. Only a few approaches are supported by automated tools. Some of those tools are libraries to
be used to implement a fault- tolerant system: they either support a model-driven development, or provide
primitives for implementing architectures which follow the idealised fault-tolerant component model. Other
approaches allow some form of code generation from architectural specifications or offer specialised middleware
that supports run-time architectural reconfiguration. There are tools (LTSA and AEREAL) that are employed
for validation of fault-tolerant architectures. Most of those tools, however, are at a prototypal phase or no
longer supported. To the best of our knowledge, only a few tools are still being developed and improved.
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Fig. 6. The Fault Tolerance Viewpoint Classification
VI. PARAMETERS BY PARAMETERS VIEW: FAULT TOLERANCE VIEWPOINT
This section analyses the selected approaches following the fault tolerance classification parameters defined in
Section IV-B. The results of this analysis are summarised in Figure 6.
A. Fault Assumptions
Fault assumptions define the types of faults that the proposed architectural solution is intended to tolerate. Our
main focus here is on describing the assumptions in terms of software architectures. The approaches offer a good
coverage of the types of faults they can tolerate: some of them deal specifically with the failures of architectural
elements (components or connectors), others are intended for system (configuration or architectural) level exceptions
and inconsistencies, while the remaining few deal with hardware faults, human errors and those detected during
architectural reconfiguration.
Component failures, which represent errors at the architectural level, are addressed in the majority of the
approaches (see Figure 6). These can be grouped into five major categories:
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• Approaches A03-A06, A14, A15, A17-A19, A22-A25, A30-A32 and A34 deal with the exceptions explicitly
reported by individual components when they are not able to deliver the expected results; it is very often the
case that the component interfaces are extended with the descriptions of the exceptions they can signal (e.g.
A06 and A25).
• Approaches A13, A15, A20, A22, A26, A27, A29, A34, A35, A44 and A48 focus on failures of individual
components with well-defined semantics of their failure behaviour, such as crash, value or Byzantine failures.
Even though several of these deal with value failures, only approach A34 specifically requires that components
have pre- and post-conditions associated with them. Some of these approaches deal with both crash and value
failures (A26 and A27).
• Some approaches are not specific about the failure behaviour of the components, assuming only that components
can fail and leaving the assumption particulars and the choice of error detection measures till later design phases
(A28, A35-A39, A41, A42, A44, A45, A46, A47).
• Several approaches (A01, A08, A29, A32, A33 and A46) deal with general types of design faults in component
software (bugs) (see Figure 6, item Software Design Faults in Components).
• Two approaches (A02 and A07) explicitly focus on software design faults in the new releases of the components.
Connectors failures are explicitly addressed by approaches A03, A24, A38 and A39. These failures are propagated
by connectors to a higher-level architectural context in which they are dealt with. For example, approach A03
introduces the concept of configuration exception handling to support system reconfiguration when exceptions are
explicitly propagated by individual components or connectors. To do this systematically, components and connectors
interfaces specify the exceptions these elements can propagate when they cannot deliver the service expected from
them.
Approaches addressing system level inconsistencies and errors deal with abnormal situations which affect the
architectural level and involve several interlinked components. A04, A06, A09, A11, A21, A24 and A30-A32
assume that such errors emerge in the course of a defined set of components explicitly cooperating. Approach A10
specifically focuses on general solutions for dealing with architectural level mismatches. Approaches A12, A14 and
A22 deal with general types of abnormal behaviour exhibited at the system level.
Many of the approaches deal with several types of faults: for example, approach A22 covers individual component
failures and system level errors. Approach A29 provides tolerance of both design bugs in components and hardware
crashes.
A relatively small number of approaches focus specifically on hardware faults (A14, A16, A26, A27, A29, A35,
A36, and A40) but even when doing so they always consider the implications at the level of software architecture
and propose solutions in the software architecture context. A14 and A40 deal with the hardware-induced software
faults and host crashes, whereas A16 deals with service failures, where services are viewed as a combination of
software and hardware on which this software is located. The approaches discussed do not explicitly deal with
the environmental faults. This is because they usually assume that the environment (e.g. sensors) is represented by
components and the component faults are therefore used to represent the faults in the environment. Approach A27
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is different in this respect as it introduces special architectural measures for dealing with sensor failures.
B. The Origins of the Software Architecture Solution
It is only natural that the majority of the architectural solutions discussed here rely on the existing fault tolerance
mechanisms which were initially developed for the design or implementation phases. It is clear, at the same time,
that as some of these mechanisms (e.g. found in the middleware) deal with the implementation level problems by
using implementation level means, they do not have any counterparts at the architectural level.
By now a number of the major fault tolerance mechanisms have been moved to the architectural level and
presented in terms of components, connectors and system configurations (see Figure 6, item software diversity and
replication). A01 uses the idea of recovery blocks with the special decision logic implementing the acceptance test
and with the two alternates (the high-performance and the high assurance ones); the initial architecture supporting
only parallel execution of the alternates was later extended to allow their sequential execution, closely adhering to
the original idea of recovery blocks. Approaches A28 and A42 apply the idea of recovery blocks for architecting
Web Service composition, A29 supports both recovery blocks and distributed recovery blocks [53]. Approaches A02,
A07 and A33 rely on the ideas of N-version programming. Approach A27 uses the idea of N-modular redundancy,
whereas A08 and A47 use a combination of recovery blocks, N-version programming and N-modular redundancy.
A20 is similar to the N Self-Checking Programming technique for software fault tolerance [54]; however it does
not employ two levels of comparison since this scheme does not deal with design bugs. A14 uses replication
of the COTS components and the majority voting on component results. A15 employs several known replication
strategies at the architectural component level: primary-standby, active and load-balancing redundancy. A40 relies
on a different set of replication strategies, including first-pass, voting and passive. A26, A32 and A46 develop
general architectural frameworks which allow N-version programming, recovery blocks or component replication
to be applied. A48 is based on active replication (without voting) combined with heartbeats used to detect replica
failures, after which the system is reconfigured.
The majority of these approaches use architectural level exception handling (see Figure 6) as it provides structuring
support for application-specific recovery. The idealised fault tolerant component blueprint initially proposed for
designing fault tolerant systems [34] has been extensively used for developing various architectural solutions (A04,
A05, A16, A17, A19, A23, A24 and A30). The ideas of atomic actions and Coordinated Atomic actions were applied
at the architectural level in approaches A04-A06, A09, A11, A21 and A30-A32 to support cooperative recovery
involving several cooperating components and to structure systems using nested units of component cooperation.
Note here that A04 and A05 introduce an extra (orthogonal) architectural view for reasoning about component
cooperation. Approach A21 uses Coordinated Atomic actions for structuring system reconfiguration during fault
handling.
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C. Steps of Fault Tolerance
The three general steps of fault tolerance which each approach can provide are error detection, error handling
and fault handling.
Several approaches cover all three steps (A08, A10, A14, A20, A24 and A37). Approach A08 is based on
the RAIC (redundant array of independent components) architecture which uses several diverse components to
detect errors, recover from them and, if necessary, decommission failing components. Approach A24 introduces an
idealised fault tolerant element architectural style, which incorporates features for error detection, error recovery
by exception handling and localised reconfiguration at the level of individual connectors and components.
The majority of approaches deal with error detection and error handling (e.g. A01, A26, A27, A38). Several
approaches (A05, A11, A19, A23, A25, A30-A32 and A34) only deal with error handling (all of them propose
solutions for handling exceptions at the architectural level without discussing how to detect errors or how to handle
faults causing these errors) while two approaches (A21 and A22) focus exclusively on fault handling and, more
specifically, on reconfiguring systems to rid them of faults.
A number of approaches (A15, A28, A35 and A48) detect component failures and, without trying to recover
from these system errors, move directly to fault handling by system reconfiguration. For example, A15 uses a fault
propagation graph to define the part of the architecture that needs reconfiguring.
D. Error Detection
Error detection means are an element in the majority of the architectural solutions discussed here - see Figure 6.
These solutions offer a wide variety of ways in which errors can be detected at the architectural level.
Approaches A01, A08, A24, A26, A28, A29, A32, A37, A46 and A4 use specially designed acceptance tests to
check the results of diversely designed components (alternates). For example, A28 employs a dedicated monitoring
component to check these results, A29 describes acceptance tests as component aspects, and A47 uses executable
assertions for detecting component (web service) failures.
Approaches A02, A07, A08, A14, A20, A26, A27, A32, A33, A36-A38, A40, A41, A43, A46 and A47 employ
compensation schemes which compare multiple execution results for detecting errors. This is used for tolerating
both hardware faults and software design bugs. For example, in approach A07 a dedicated multi-version connector
monitors the execution of several component releases and records its history. By contrast, approach A26 proposes a
style which includes a decider component for result adjudication when versions are executed sequentially (recovery
blocks) or in parallel (compensation).
Some approaches explicitly assume that component errors are detected by some extra architectural elements
(connectors and/or components) as part of the architectural style for developing idealised components capable of
detecting errors. In this case these components detect errors themselves and the corresponding exceptions are defined
in the component interfaces as part of the software architecture description (A04, A16, A17, A24).
Several approaches (A15, A35, A46, A48) describe specific error detection functionalities on which they rely to
detect failures of components: watchdog, heartbeat, timeouts and pings. For example, A15 specifically links these
May 25, 2012 DRAFT
41
functionalities with dedicated connectors.
Approach A34 offers an application-specific solution that uses pre- and post-conditions to detect component
failures. To ensure the effectiveness and the practicality of this solution, error recovery is here attached to FT
components, large-grain objects specifically constructed to contain errors.
In approach A44 failure detectors are introduced at the architectural level to make decisions about component
failures. Approach A06 explicitly introduces a protective wrapper, a redundant architectural element intended for
detecting errors coming from the component or sent to the component. Approach A10 offers general solutions for
detecting errors caused by architectural mismatches using additional information associated with components.
System level error detection is used in approaches A06, A09, A12 and A13. For example, A13 uses a dedicated
monitoring infrastructure called Lira, which collects information about critical events at the architectural level. In
addition to acceptance tests and result comparison, approach A08 uses just in time component testing to ensure
better coverage of error detection.
E. Error Handling Type
The application-specific error handling in the form of forward error recovery which uses exception handling
is clearly the dominant approach - see Figure 6. Considering that this type of recovery is the most general and
effective, this is understandable. Moreover, from architects point of view, the assumption that architectural elements
can be rolled back for recovery does not seem to be appropriate; the main reason for this can be either that they
often deal with the COTS components or that this assumption is too strong/restricting to be accepted at the earlier
steps of system development. This is, for example, explicitly stated by the authors of A46, who clearly understand
that it is not always possible to develop checkpointing for the black box COTS components or to expect that such
components come with this functionality implemented.
Several approaches use various forms of compensation (A02, A07, A08, A14, A15, A18, A20, A26, A27, A32,
A33, A36-A38, A40, A41, A43, A46 and A47) - they employ redundant (diverse or replicated) versions of software
components to mask errors. All of them run several versions in parallel and adjudicate their results to define
the correct ones. Approach A20 employs redundant sources of information of the Internet (Web Services) and
four dedicated architectural elements (called Bridge, Comparator, ServiceBroker and FT Registry) which ensure
comparison of results and, if necessary, dynamic reconfiguration (i.e. fault handling) when some of the elements
fail. Some of these schemes support various forms of compensation, for example, A08 allows a combination of N-
version programming and triple-modular redundancy depending on the configuration chosen. Approach A33 supports
architecting double modular redundancy and N-version programming schemes using aspect-oriented architecture
design.
Approaches A01, A08, A15, A18, A26, A29, A32, A37-A43, A45, and A46 rely on recovery blocks and execute
redundant versions sequentially with some sort of acceptance test which checks version results. It is interesting that
some of them allow versions to be run in parallel (A01 and A40) so they use the results of the first version that
passes the acceptance test as the correct ones.
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A number of approaches (A08, A15, A18, A26, A32, A37, A38, A40, A41, A43, A46, A47) introduce general
architectures within which both compensation and backward error recovery can be implemented depending on the
specific fault assumptions and the redundant resources available. Some are even more general and support forward
error recovery as well: A32, A37, A43, A46. The levels of detail in these proposals are very different. Some of
them introduce only general architectures (e.g. the metaobject one in A43) and discuss their potential applicability
for various types of recovery in general terms. Others offer much more detailed architectural frameworks for
selecting specific architectural recovery styles (e.g. A46). A37 discusses various solutions for extending the existing
architectures with fault tolerance by integrating various fault tolerance tactics into them.
Approaches A02 and A07 both employ previous releases of components as a means for tolerating faults in the
new release using diversity; in addition to this, A07 also supports architectural undo when the states of all releases
are moved back (A07 being the only approach explicitly supporting backward error recovery).
It is interesting to note that approach A18 supports general system level exception handling, giving as the specific
examples the compensation-based approaches: the RAIC defined in A08 and component replication.
Approach A10 introduces a general framework for dealing with errors caused by architectural mismatches and
as such supports all types of error handling.
F. Fault Handling Type
With system (re)configuration being in the core of software architecture, it should not come as a surprise that a
considerable number of approaches offer support for fault handling by reconfiguration - see Figure 6.
These approaches defining interesting and unusual combinations of error recovery and fault handling mechanisms
are briefly presented below.
Approach A08 uses the RAIC architecture that, in addition to error recovery by compensation, supports the
decommissioning of underperforming components and inclusion of new components into the array (with their state
modified to be identical with the rest). All this activity is conducted by a specialised RAIC controller.
Approach A12 supports various exception handling strategies which can provide both error recovery and system
reconfiguration for fault handling. The latter is done by using a set of available components (by adjusting their
parameters or by building new configurations of them). Approach A03 explicitly introduces reconfigurations as
configuration level exception handlers.
Approach A13 introduces multi-level reconfiguration of assemblies of COTS components. System-level error
detection is conducted by monitoring certain system-level events, which is followed by run-time fault diagnosis and
fault handling by reconfiguration. Three reconfiguration levels are defined: the component, composition and global
levels, so that if it is not possible to handle a fault at a lower level an attempt is made to do so at a higher one.
Approach A15 introduces a managing layered architecture in which components can fail and be repaired and
different reconfiguration policies are defined. It supports replica reconfiguration by adding, repairing or removing
individual replicas. The components to be involved in system reconfiguration are defined by the fault propagation
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graph, which is to be developed as part of system architecture. The focus of this work is on defining modelling
techniques for analysing systems which support fault handling.
Exception handling approach A18 allows some forms of fault handling by supporting description of the so-called
”induced failures” defining components, which are to be treated as failed after an exception is raised and handled.
This approach combines system level exception handling and fault handling strategies. It considers the RAIC,
component reboot and component replacement as special cases.
In addition to error recovery by the compensation approach, A20 supports dynamic reconfiguration using a registry
which allows the system broker to dynamically find redundant and available web services which can be deployed
to replace the failed ones. Approach A21 uses Coordinated Atomic actions for architectural reconfiguration as part
of fault handling, which allows us to tolerate system level faults during reconfiguration by employing cooperative
exception handling. Approach A22 defines a theory for modelling and verification of various dynamic reconfiguration
strategies. Approach A24 introduces localised reconfiguration as a possible way of conducting error recovery; this
is executed at the level of individual connectors and components.
Approach A35, built on top of component architectures (such as CORBA, DCOM and EJB), reconfigures a
system by replacing failed components with their replicas, ensuring that all messages are redirected to the new
components.
As was mentioned before, approach A37 supports integration of fault tolerance tactics into the existing system
architectures. Some of these tactics support fault handling: removing components from the service, resynchronisation
of the failed component and its reintegration into the system.
Approach A48 implements architectural level reconfiguration of the replica set for each service component, so
that these replicas can be run in an active replication scheme without voting.
G. Exception Handling
In order to summarise exception handling architectural approaches, it is necessary first to look into how exceptions
are propagated. This is typically done after an error is detected either by architectural elements (components,
connectors) or by the system/architecture itself. Approaches A03-A06, A16, A17, A19, A23-A25, A30-A32, and
A34 assume that individual components signal exceptions to the level of architecture. Approaches A03, A24 and
A25 extend this idea to individual connectors. Approaches A09 and A18 allow abstract exceptions to be signalled
at the architectural level, without assuming that they come from either individual components or connectors. These
approaches are applicable when the system architecture includes a glue code responsible for composing components
into a system. Approach A06 assumes that components are wrapped by a dedicated wrapper component that
represents component behaviour in the context of the system architecture, in which case it is clear that this component
should be able to signal architectural-level exceptions.
Our second classification criterion establishes where exceptions are handled in the architecture. Approaches A04,
A05, A16, A17, A19, A23-A25, A30 and A34 support exception handling by individual components, whereas
approaches A24 and A25 allow not only component-level but also connector-level exception handling. Approach
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A34 uses the architectural concept of an FT component, a large grained unit which has exceptions and exception
handlers associated with it.
A considerable number of approaches support cooperative exception handling which involves sets of cooperating
components: A04-A06, A09, A11, A19, A24, A30-A32. Let us consider A04 as an example. This approach defines
two orthogonal dimensions in which exception handling is conducted: (i) exceptions can be defined in the component
interface, in which case they are handled by the caller component and (ii) exceptions can be raised by cooperating
components which play a role in the same collaboration, in which case a cooperative recovery involving all the
roles is conducted. Approach A30 supports two level exception handling - at the component and at the cooperative
action levels. Some approaches support system level exception handling without associating it specifically with
any architectural elements: A06, A12 and A18. For example, in approach A12 exception handling strategies are
defined during component (peer services in this case) composition, and they can include various architectural level
activities, including changing the attributes of individual components as well as connections between components
and system reconfiguration. These specific cases of error recovery reveal the similarity between this approach and
approach A03, which explicitly defines configuration-level exception handling, so that reactions to architectural
level exceptions are defined in terms of system reconfiguration activities.
Some approaches use stylised architectures or a set of guidelines to represent exception handling at the
architectural level. Two major general stylised approaches are the idealised fault tolerant component (A04, A05,
A16, A17, A19, A23, and A24) and Coordinated Atomic actions (A04-A06, A09, A11, A30-A32). An example
of the former is approach A17, in which each component is architectured as a style with two components and
three connectors, with a specialised component called AbnormalActivity designed to conduct exception handling.
All of the approaches relying on Coordinated Atomic actions use some form of concurrent exception resolution at
the architectural level to deal with exceptions concurrently raised at the system level by action participants. For
example, approach A09 supports cooperative recovery of several COTS components involved in cooperation at the
architectural level by introducing a cooperating connector that contains all cooperative recovery and deals with
concurrent exceptions by resolving them when necessary.
It is interesting to note here that all exception handling approaches without exception use the termination
model [55], which is clearly much more suitable than the resumption model for the architectural level reasoning
about systems.
Many approaches (e.g. A15, A37 and A46) do not support full-fledged exception handling even though all
exceptions propagated from components trigger recovery actions, as they allow only predefined types of handling
based on backward error recovery or compensation.
H. Error Confinement and Recovery Domain
The majority of the architectural error recovery approaches assume that individual components confine errors.
For example, in approaches A02 and A07 errors are confined to the component (i.e. its new release). Approach A24
extends this to connectors and to sets of cooperating components. Connectors are considered as units of confinement
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and recovery in approaches A09, A19 and A24. In A09 an action of cooperating components is architectured as a
specialised cooperating connector which has several roles, one for each component, so that recovery always involves
groups of components.
There are several approaches (A04-A06, A09, A11, A19, A24, A30-A32) which use cooperative recovery
involving several cooperating components at the architectural level (the Groups of Components item in
Figure 6). In this case, the architecture of the systems is built using structuring units of component cooperation as
the first class entities. These approaches deal with both error confinement and consistency of recovery involving
several components which work together not only during normal system execution, but during recovery as well.
Approach A04 relies on two architectural views for confinement and recovery: (i) the individual component view,
in which components confine errors so that recovery is conducted at a higher level by the caller, and (ii) the
collaboration view, in which cooperative recovery can be conducted by involving several components which play
a role in the same collaboration. Approaches A05, A30 and A32 support two types of recovery: local recovery
at the component level and cooperative recovery, which involves several cooperating components inside an action,
allowing two types of recovery domains: individual components and actions (groups) of cooperating components.
Approaches A03, A10, A12, A15, A18, A22 and A25 do not assume any general ways of system structuring for
confinement and recovery and thus rely on application-specific decisions architectured for each specific exception
(the System level category in Figure 6). For example, in approach A18 error confinement and recovery areas
are defined by the exception strategy description, individually for each system level exception. In a similar way,
approach A25 allows any element of the architecture to be involved in recovery if there is an explicit exception
flow linking it with the source of exceptions (another component).
I. Multilevel Recovery
The idea of defining recursive structuring units of system architecture is crucial for dealing with system complexity
and for fault tolerance. Introducing these units allows architects to define error confinement and recovery domains
and to ensure that when a recovery in such a unit is not possible, the responsibility for recovery is passed on in a
systematic and well-defined way to the containing unit. This structuring is referred to as multilevel recovery at the
architectural level.
Unfortunately, the vast majority of the approaches do not introduce multilevel recovery. Yet there are several
which support it in various innovative ways. As was mentioned above, approaches A05, A30 and A32 allow
two level error recovery: when recovery is not possible at the component level, the responsibility for recovery is
transferred to the level of a group of cooperating components. Approaches A06 and A31 take this idea further by
supporting nested system structuring using the concept of Coordinated Atomic actions which involves nested sets of
cooperating components. Approach A11 only focuses on architecturing systems using nested Coordinated Atomic
actions, based on understanding the simplest action as an action with only one participant which executes a set of
operations bracketed at an ACID transaction.
The architectural approaches which follow the Idealised fault tolerant component blueprint (A04, A05, A16 A17,
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A19, A23, A24 and A30) support layered system structuring for Recovery, treating each component as a recovery
domain; when this recovery is not possible, the responsibility for recovery is passed on to the caller component
using exception propagation.
Approach A03 introduces an interesting way of nested architecture structuring by incorporating a mechanism
for defining subconfigurations and nested reconfigurations into the configuration level exception handling. Sub-
configurations describe a subset of components and connectors whose interaction may lead to an exception.
Reconfigurations define handlers, so that each of them can define a new configuration, which in its turn may
include nested specifications of reconfigurations.
J. Types of Redundancy
All architectural level fault tolerance approaches use architectural redundancy. Each specific case defines a
specially tailored combination of redundant resources. A clear understanding of the redundancy which each scheme
uses often offers a deep insight into how a scheme functions and its benefits or weaknesses. Several typical examples
are discussed below.
Many approaches assume that component and connector specifications are extended with definitions of the
exceptions which they can propagate (for example, A03, A04, A12, A15, A24, A30).
Approach A03 uses redundant configurations for exception handling at the architectural level.
In approach A06 an additional component, i.e. component wrappers, is introduced as a glue code responsible for
local error detection and recovery as well as cooperative recovery.
Approach A26 relies on an architectural style which links together redundant components and a decider component
to ensure the fail stop semantics of the composed element.
Approaches A01, A02, A07, A08, A14, A15, A20, A26, A27, A29, A32, A33, A35, A36, A37-A41 and A45-A48
use diverse/replicated components together with some adjudicating and controlling mechanisms (often architectured
as specialised connectors) to manage them. For example, approach A01 uses the so-called analytical redundancy in
two versions: a high-assurance and a high-performance one. A02 and A07 use several releases of a component. A45
proposes a metaobject architecture called FRIENDS, which manages replicas of the base level components. Approach
A47 defines the concept of an equivalent service to allow components to be used as diverse implementations.
Each of the approaches that follow the IFTC blueprint defines a style which consists of a set of specialised
connectors and components that together ensure the idealised behaviour of the application component. For example,
in approach A17 each component is implemented as a style which consists of two components and three connectors.
To support architectural level exception handling, approach A12 uses redundant links between components,
redundancy at the system level to allow adjustment of the underperforming components and redundant exception
handling code at the system level. Approach A13 uses the following redundancy: the Lira infrastructure for
monitoring (error detection) and reconfiguring, and a decision maker for fault diagnosis. Approach A25 employs a
number of redundant features: additional information related to exceptions associated with components, exception
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flow views that link components during handling using a special type of connectors called duct (this effectively
offers a redundant view) and an additional code for exception handling attached to each component.
K. Fault Tolerance Viewpoint Summary
Figure 7 summarises our analysis from the fault tolerance viewpoint.
• Fault assumptions. The assumptions are typically expressed in terms of software architecture. The majority
of the approaches focus on dealing with various failures of individual components (these include exceptions
propagated by components when they cannot deliver the required service). There is some earlier work (before
2003) on dealing with software design faults by employing diverse implementations of components. No
approaches directly deal with faults in the environments; the main reason for this, in our view, is that the
environment of the system is typically dealt with by wrapping all sensors or actuators into regular components,
so that failures of those components represent environmental faults.
• Steps of fault tolerance. Several approaches deal with all three steps: error detection, error handling and fault
handling. The vast majority of the approaches support error handling, as their main purpose is to ensure that the
system continues to provide the service by dealing with errors. Fault handling by reconfiguration is another very
popular approach; this can be explained by the fact that dealing with system configuration and reconfiguration
is a concern typically addressed at the architectural level, so adding fault handling to this functionality is a
very natural step.
• The origins of the software architecture solution. All the approaches discussed in the survey originate in the
previous work on software-implemented fault tolerance. Nearly all major fault tolerance techniques have been
moved to the software architecture domain (recovery blocks, N-version programming, conversation, replication,
exception handling). Unlike the mainstream fault tolerance, only a few approaches rely on checkpointing, which
has limited applicability for COTS components. The role of exception handling at the architectural level is
growing as many researchers realise that this is the most suitable mechanism for achieving effective recovery
during system architecting. At the same time, there is a growing realisation that the Internet can offer a rich
source of replicated and diversely-implemented components (services).
• Error detection. All error detection solutions can be divided into two categories. Some of them assume that the
components themselves detect errors and inform the architectural level (e.g. by raising exceptions). Approaches
of the other type use additional architectural-level solutions, such as wrappers, glue code, connectors, monitoring
infrastructure.
• Error handling type. Forward error recovery is the predominant solution: the majority of the approaches use
various forms of exception handling for handling errors. Compensation is quite popular as it can be naturally
expressed in terms of software architectures (e.g. by employing diverse or redundant components), and although
it requires substantial component-level redundancy, it can clearly be successfully used at the architectural level.
Only a few approaches support backward error recovery, based on the assumption that components provide
the save/restore state functionality.
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Fig. 7. The FT Viewpoint
May 25, 2012 DRAFT
49
• Exception handling. In the surveyed approaches, exceptions can be raised either by the individual architectural
elements (components or connectors) or by the dedicated additional software located at the architectural
level, which detects errors. After exceptions have been raised, they can be propagated to and handled at
a number of destinations: individual components or connectors, sets of cooperating components, architectural
configurations. To assist architecting systems with exception handling, many approaches introduce specialised
exception handling styles. These are typically based on either the earlier idea of the idealised fault tolerant
component or on the concept of Coordinated Atomic actions.
• Error confinement and recovery domain. The typical approach assumes that errors are confined to individual
components (although only a few of them explicitly state this or discuss how to ensure that this assumption
holds). In some cases this allows the architecture recovery to be reduced to the recovery of individual
components. This solution works only if we do not need to ensure the consistency of several interacting
components while recovering one of them, and when there are guarantees that the erroneous information does
not leave the components. Such local recovery is cheaper than that which involves several components, but
in many systems in which components are tightly coupled the only possible solution is to involve a set of
cooperating components in recovery. Approaches which provide this solution often introduce architectural level
structuring (e.g. scopes, actions) which precisely defines the sets of components to be involved in cooperative
recovery.
• Multilevel recovery. The majority of the approaches do not provide multilevel recovery. The few that do
this can be categorised into two major groups, those which support nested structuring following the ideas of
Coordinated Atomic actions, and those which rely on the layered architecture using the ideas of idealised fault
tolerant component. There are two solutions, however, that do not fall under either of these categories: the first
one introduces nested subconfigurations and the second one provides only two level recovery: at the levels of
components and actions.
• Fault handling types. The majority of fault handling mechanisms support various forms of architectural
level reconfiguration that ensures that the faulty component is removed. This approach fits into the software
architecture view extremely well. Some of the existing solutions extend exception handling with fault handling
functionalities. There are several interesting solutions proposed, including multilevel reconfiguration, definition
of reconfiguration policies, and introduction of a dedicated reconfiguration layer. Unfortunately, the functionality
for conducting fault diagnostics is explicitly introduced in just a few approaches.
• Type of redundancy. The approaches under consideration use a broad variety of redundant resources. Each
approach uses a specially tailored combination of extra components, connectors, inter-component links and
component interfaces. Thus, many employ diverse or replicated components with some adjudicating and
controlling components. All of the surveyed approaches need extra time for conducting fault tolerance activities.
VII. CONSIDERATIONS AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
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The investigation of how to specify and analyse fault tolerant architectures started in around 1996 with the
CMU/SEI SIMPLEX architecture for ensuring fault tolerance in evolving hardware and software systems. Since
2001 there has been a steady stream of research papers, mostly presented in workshops and conferences. Between
2001 and 2003 the main focus was on architectural styles and patterns for fault tolerant architectures. Since 2004,
however, there has been a noticeable growth in the area: new contributors joining in, a new interest in the topic,
indicated by a larger number of papers published, and a new maturity of the research community, as demonstrated
by the many journal and book publications produced.
In this section we will describe similarities identified when comparing the two perspectives discussed in this
study (Section VII-A), and propose an agenda for future directions of research in the area (Section VII-B).
A. Identified Similarities
The authors of this study are convinced that software architecture and fault tolerance rely on very similar sets of
fundamental principles which are crucial for both domains. Moreover, we believe that the work in the two areas,
perceived by many as quite distinct, is in fact driven by similar forces. These include:
• Managing system complexity. Without a clear understanding of system structuring, systems cannot be reasoned
about, not can fault tolerance be developed systematically.
• Effective system structuring. Fault tolerance cannot be achieved without it (for example, to ensure error
confinement, to understand error propagation and to conduct multilevel recovery), while the essence of software
architecture is system structuring at the earlier development phases.
• The importance of component level reasoning. Components are clearly the basic blocks of any architecture
and the main elements of any architectural level representation. At the same time, ensuring that errors are
contained and dealt with at the level of components (e.g. nodes, modules, classes, agents, objects, and servers)
is the most efficient way of achieving fault tolerance. Various wrapping techniques and styles are used at the
architectural level to ensure these properties of components.
• Understanding component dependencies. In the SA community, knowing component dependencies is essential
for architecture evolution and configuration [56]. In fault tolerance, the choice of the appropriate recovery
strategy heavily depends on a clear understanding of error propagation between components. Both domains
strive to reduce the number of dependencies.
• A clear definition of component interfaces. In system integration, architectural configurations can be built only
when the component interfaces are known. For error detection, either component interfaces are extended with
interface exceptions, or the information visible at the interfaces of several components is checked to detect
complex erroneous conditions at the system level.
• Similar modularization criteria. These are applied in constructing complex systems to ensure their fault tolerance
and to improve their architectures [57], [29], [58]. Both domains aim at developing systems with fewer
inter-component links to make it easy for the developers to understand, maintain, upgrade and verify them.
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The essence of system architecturing is defining system components and their interconnections, thus keeping
information links between components in check contributes to better system structuring. There are several
reasons why modularization is particularly important for achieving fault tolerance. For one thing, system
modularization allows representing its functioning in both normal and fault tolerance modes. Also, generally
speaking, decreasing the number of inter- component links facilitates system recovery as it allows errors to be
contained in smaller recovery domains (i.e., smaller parts of system architectures).
• Addressing earlier development phases. While software architecture is always determined at the earlier
development phases, it is becoming clearer to many researchers working in fault tolerance that in order to be
successful fault tolerance should be systematically applied from the same stage [59], [60].
It is interesting that the fault-error-failure chain, which is in the core of dependability concepts, is effectively
defined in terms of architectural elements: a component failure can cause an error which can propagate to the
architectural level boundary and result in system failure. Finally, it should be pointed out that there are concepts
which are understood by the two communities in a very similar way, the most important ones being the concepts
of components, interfaces and configuration, as well as the idea of using specialised styles and patterns to help
system developers.
B. Agenda for Future Research
This section will describe our view of the current and future directions of research in fault tolerant software
architectures.
Service-oriented and Dynamic Architecture. Service-Oriented Computing is considered to be a challenging
computing paradigm that utilizes services as fundamental elements for developing applications. Service-oriented
architecture (SOA) is a component model that links different functional units of an application, called services,
through well-defined interfaces and contracts between them.
One of the defining characteristics of a SOA is its dynamicity. In the dynamic SA paradigm (usually referred to
as DSA), architectures evolve dynamically, either because the existing components/services are modified, replaced
or removed, or because new components are plugged in (as in, for instance, Service Oriented Architectures,
publish/subscribe architectures, peer to peer distributed architectures). These run-time modifications may arise in
response to the need to recover from functional or performance malfunctions, or may also be the natural consequence
of the system evolution cycle.
In a service oriented architecture, service composition requires dynamic reconfiguration of services, and the SA,
providing the reference model, should allow the system to evolve with new components, defining the way in which
these can interact with the existing structure.
There is a growing amount of research dealing with fault tolerance in SOA, but only one of the surveyed
approaches explicitly deals with SOA [61]. The recent work has, however, mainly focused on the design and
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implementation phases, or middleware construction, rather than investigating how to architect a fault tolerant
SOA system. This area can clearly benefit from introducing reasoning at higher levels of abstraction. For
example, architectural patterns and styles for designing fault tolerant architectures (see Figure 5, the “FT style”
column) could be revised so as to fit SOA; dynamically reconfigurable fault tolerant SA approaches (see Figure 5
) and approaches addressing the “Run-time FT” topic could be adjusted for dealing with SOA reconfiguration needs.
Software Product Line Architectures. A software product line architecture (SPLA) [62] precisely captures, in
a single specification, the overall architecture of a suite of closely-related products (rather than specifying the
architecture of a single software system). The techniques for doing so are rooted in the disciplines of SA and
configuration management, and focus on capturing the mandatory elements (which are present in the architecture
of each and every product) and the variation points (which define the dimensions along which the architectures of
the individual products can differ). A single product line architecture may have many variation points that are often
orthogonal to each other: as a result, a considerable number of the product architectures can be formed by a single
product line architecture.
This survey has identified only one approach which explicitly refers to “architectures of architectures”, presented
in [63]. Being able to specify and then analyse a FT product line architecture will make it possible to improve
the dependability of the entire family of architectures.
Model Driven Architecture and Explicit Resilience. Shifting the focus of software development from coding
to modelling is one of the main achievements of Model-Driven Architecture [64] (MDA), which separates the
application logic from the underlying platform technology and gives them precise semantic models. Consequently,
models are the primary artefacts retained as the first class entities that can be manipulated using automated model
transformations, in order to move from models to implementation. Software Architecture plays a fundamental role in
MDA, and the current research in the SA community has put considerable effort in understanding how to bridge the
gap between requirements and software architecture [65], [66], and between software architecture and coding [23],
[52], [24].
In the dependability community, the need for explicitly dealing with fault tolerance (i.e., resilience) concerns
during the entire life cycle has been recently recognised as one of the main approaches to ensuring the overall
system dependability [12], [59], [67]. Fault tolerance ontologies are being proposed as part of the ReSIST Network
of Excellence [67] to help capture the fault tolerance concerns at each development step and bridge the gap between
these steps.
Only few of the surveyed approaches deal with model-based specifications of FT SA and code generation from
models (see Figure 5, the “Specification” and “Specification and Coding” columns), and only [63] makes an explicit
reference to MDA. Many approaches, instead, cover the topic of fault tolerance during the software development
process (see Figure 5, the “FT Software Process” column).
Introducing new FT SA approaches which explicitly take the MDA principles into account will simplify the
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specification and analysis of architectures and make the overall development more effective by avoiding the typical
contamination of the architectural specification process by implementation considerations.
Self-healing Systems. In the last few years there has been a growing interest in the areas directly related and
partially overlapping with fault tolerance, such as system self-healing, self-adaptation and self- management.
Software-intensive self-healing systems are capable of self-managing through run-time adaptation to changes
which could put the system at risk, including alterations of the available resources, dynamically changing user’s
needs, system intrusions or faults, and changes in the system environment. A self-healing system must configure
and reconfigure itself, continually tuning and optimising its own behaviour, protecting and recovering itself from
emerging threats, while keeping its complexity hidden from the user [68]. The promise of self-healing for our area
is that it could allow us to automatically reconfigure the FT architecture when unforeseen and abnormal events
happen at run-time. Even so, while this research is clearly relevant to fault tolerance, the relationship between
fault tolerance and self- healing needs to be better understood.
Innovative Technologies and Tools. The most effective way of applying academic research is developing
advanced technologies and tools. However, while integrating fault tolerance at the architectural level has been
the focus of extensive theoretical exploration, not much has been produced in terms of mature technologies and
tools (see Figure 5, the “Tool Support” column). In fact, most of the existing tools are at the prototype stage.
New industrial-strength technologies and tools are needed to allow practitioners to effectively and efficiently
deal with fault tolerance at the various phases of the development process. These should include fully-specified
architectural languages which explicitly support error detection, error recovery and fault handling, as well
as tools that enable the verification and validation of fault tolerance-specific properties. The focus should
be on assessing the achieved level of fault tolerance and evaluating the dependability properties of the fault
tolerant system. A very promising example of this is the ongoing work on the Architecture Analysis & Design
Language - AADL. Defined by the Society of Automotive Engineers as the aerospace standard AS5506 [69],
this language is supported by an Eclipse-based development environment. It has been extended by an Error
ModelAnnex [70], to be used for specifying various error models of components and connections, as well as the
appropriate redundancy management and risk mitigation methods chosen during system architecting. These features
enable qualitative and quantitative assessments of such system dependability properties as reliability and availability.
Dealing with Dependability Means. Dependability is an integrated concept encompassing a variety of attributes,
including availability, reliability, safety, integrity and maintainability. Generally, there are four means to be
employed to attain dependability: fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal and fault forecasting. Clearly, in
practice a combination of these needs to be applied to ensure the required dependability level. It is important to
remember that all these activities are built around the concept of faults: where possible, faults are prevented or
eliminated by using appropriate development and verification techniques, while the remaining ones are tolerated
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at runtime to avoid system failures and estimated to help predict their consequences. As shown in this survey,
in some cases fault removal (by testing or model-checking) and fault tolerance have been applied together at
the architectural level. Certain types of analysis (such as performance and simulation) have also been applied to
verify the quality of fault tolerant architectures. It appears that there is a need for deeper integration of these
complementary techniques, in order to meet the increasing dependability needs of increasingly complex systems.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The primary object of this survey is to study the ways in which current research on architecting fault tolerant
systems contributes to cross-fertilisation between the software architecture and fault tolerance communities. Yet
since the two communities continue, for many technical and non-technical reasons, to address specific issues from
different perspectives, the survey starts with analysing the existing approaches using two separate sets of parameters,
one to focus on the architecture- and the other on the dependability-specific concepts. This should allow researchers
in either domain to understand more clearly how the approaches used in the other fit in with their own investigation.
The survey then goes on to draw some conclusions based on an integrated view, which will contribute to developing
a common language that will enable software architects and fault tolerance experts to work together. The authors
then provide their personal view, based on the data gathered, of what can be expected to happen in this area in the
near future.
While there have been several workshops, tutorials and other events held which address related issues (e.g., [1],
[2], [13], [71], [22]), this survey goes much further by summarising the existing body of work and analysing the
major trends in the area. We hope our work will help to bring the researchers from the two communities together
so that they can come up with even more integrated and practical solutions.
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